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CREDIT REPORTING, PRESCREENED LISTS, AND ADVERSE
ACTION: THE IMPACT OF THE FAIR CREDIT REPORTING
ACT AND THE EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTUNITY ACT
ELWIN J. GRIFFITH*
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the years, consumers have had their fair share of challenges
in the credit arena. There was a time when a creditor could make loan
disclosures in a format of its choosing, and as a result a consumer
might not be fully aware of all the essential terms of a transaction.! It
became increasingly clear that something had to be done about
making the disclosure of the cost of credit a priority, so that a
consumer could make an informed choice among the credit terms
available to him. 2 The introduction of standard disclosures in the
* Tallahassee Alumni Professor of Law, Florida State University.
1. House report made the following point about the effect of not regulating
disclosure in the credit arena:
Today the consumer is faced with a number of credit disclosure practices,
most of which are not directly comparable to one another. With respect to
rate, some creditors employ an "add on" rate, which is based on the
original balance of the obligation as opposed to the declining balance. This
has the effect of understating the simple annual rate by approximately fifty
percent.
H.R. REP No. 90-1040, at 13 (1967), reprintedin 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1962, 1970.
2. Senator Paul Douglas, who first introduced Truth in Lending legislation in
1960, made the point that a consumer had "the right to be informed ... and to be
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marketplace meant that a consumer would be able to make a
meaningful comparison of competing lenders that would eventually
inure to his benefit. 3 With this in mind, Congress introduced the Truth
in Lending Act in 1968, 4 so that creditors would thereafter have to
make certain prescribed disclosures to their customers.
This was just the beginning. It was not too long before Congress
added two more pieces of consumer legislation, 5 which will be the
subject of this article. Having dealt with the disclosure requirements
for consumer credit, Congress then turned its attention to fair and
accurate credit reporting. It was not surprising that Congress followed
the natural trail from truth in lending to accuracy in reporting, for
credit reporting agencies had assumed a significant role in assembling
information on consumers for the benefit of lenders, and the agencies'
failure to strive for maximum possible accuracy in their reports had a
profound effect in the marketplace. 6 It was not unusual for a consumer
given the facts he needs to make an informed choice." 109 CONG. REc. 2029 (1963)
(remarks of Sen. Douglas). A House report on the Truth in Lending Act stated the
purpose of the legislation:
The committee believes that by requiring all creditors to disclose credit
information in a uniform manner, and by requiring all additional
mandatory charges imposed by the creditor as an incident to credit be
included in the computation of the applicable percentage rate, the
American consumer will be given the information he needs to compare the
cost of credit and to make the best informed decision on the use of credit.
H.R. REP. No. 90-1040, at 13 (1967), reprintedin 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1962, 1970.
3. Congress found that "economic stabilization would be enhanced and the
competition among the various financial institutions and other firms engaged in the
extension of consumer credit would be strengthened by the informed use of credit."
15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2006).
4. Act of May 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667f (2006)).
5. See Fair Credit Reporting Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1128 (1970)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681x (2006); Equal Credit Opportunity
Act, Pub. L. No. 93-495. 58 Stat. 1521 (1974) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§
1691-1691f (2006)).
6. A Senate Committee report gave some idea of the problems caused by the
reporting system:
Most credit bureaus systematically compile public record information such
as records of suits, tax liens, arrests, indictments, convictions,
bankruptcies, judgments and the like. This information is then included on
a person's report when he applies for credit, or in some cases when he
applies for employment. Unfortunately, the information cannot always be
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reporting agency to emphasize to its customers that it would not
7
guarantee the accuracy of any information that it provided to them.
Despite this, lenders still relied on the information in making their
decisions and a consumer was therefore at a lender's mercy when he
challenged the denial of any loan application. 8 Even when a consumer
found out that a lender's decision was based on an inaccurate
consumer report, the consumer still had a hard time getting his file
corrected. 9 To make matters worse, lenders were often bound by
agreement with their reporting agencies not to disclose information
10
about any agency that provided a negative report about a consumer.
kept up to date either because it is costly or because the correct
information is simply not available. Thus, it is possible for a credit bureau
to report a record of a suit or arrest without indicating that the suit was
dismissed or the arrest charges dropped.
S. REP. No. 91-517, at4 (1969).

7. See Retail Credit Co. of Atlanta, Ga.: Hearing Before a Subcomm. of the H.
Comm. on Government Operations, 90th Cong. 47 (1968) [hereinafter Retail Credit
Hearings].
8. Senator Proxmire pointed out the hazards of inaccurate and misleading
information:
Perhaps the most serious problem in the credit reporting industry is the
problem of inaccurate or misleading information. There have been no
definitive studies made of just how accurate is the information in the files
of credit reporting agencies. But even if it is 99 percent accurate-and I
doubt that it is that good-the 1 percent inaccuracy represents over a
million people. While the credit industry might be satisfied with a 1percent error, this is small comfort to the 1 million citizens whose
reputations are unjustly maligned. Moreover, the composition of the 1
million persons is constantly shifting. Everyone is a potential victim of an
inaccurate credit report. If not today, then perhaps tomorrow.
115 CONG. REC. 2411 (1969) (remarks of Sen. Proxmire).

9. See Commercial Credit Bureaus: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the H.
Comm. On Government Operations,90th Cong. 10-11 (1968).
10. One witness at a congressional hearing admitted as much when he made
the following comment:
Our contractual relationship is set up so that an underwriting department
of an insurance company or a credit grantor is not supposed to divulge that
the Retail Credit Co. made an investigation. But that is so they will not
indiscriminately send people to us when we may not be involved in an
investigation.
Retail Credit Hearings,supra note 7 (testimony of W. Lee Burge, President, Retail
Credit Co. Atlanta, Ga.). Representative Gallagher responded to Mr. Burge's
statement by observing that a consumer would never know that Retail Credit Co.
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This article will first discuss a consumer reporting agency's
obligation to provide accurate reports within the context of the Fair
Credit Reporting Act (FCRA)" and will review some of the
challenges a consumer reporting agency faces in meeting its
responsibilities thereunder. After all, an agency's report can have a
lasting impact on a consumer's credit record, and there is frequent
conflict between a consumer and the agency about the information in
the consumer's file. An agency will sometimes argue that a consumer
report is not misleading because it is technically accurate and thus the
consumer has no legitimate complaint.' 2 From the consumer's
perspective, an agency should strive for more than technical accuracy.
Many an agency has failed to convince a court with this "technical
accuracy" defense, and as a result consumer reporting agencies have
had to dig deeper for a more realistic portrayal of the consumer's
record. 13

Lenders have also had their share of challenges under the FCRA.
They have the opportunity to entice consumers from prescreened lists
with offers of credit.' 4 There is frequent disagreement about whether a
lender had made a firm offer of credit to consumers from the
prescreened lists.' 5 The courts have been keen to prevent creditors

was the source of negative information because the contract between the user and
Retail Credit Co. prevented that disclosure. Id. (statement of Rep. Gallagher).
11. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681x (2006).
12. Compare Todd v. Associated Credit Bureau Servs., Inc., 451 F. Supp. 447
(E.D. Pa. 1977) aff'd mem., 578 F.2d 1376 (3d Cir. 1978), with Koropoulos v. Credit
Bureau, Inc., 734 F.2d 37 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
13. See Dalton v. Capital Associated Indus., Inc., 257 F.3d 409, 415 (4th Cir.
2001) (finding that a report is inaccurate when it is so misleading as to have an
adverse effect on the consumer); Sepulvado v. CSC Credit Servs., 158 F.3d 890, 895
(5th Cir. 1998) (same); Swoager v. Credit Bureau of Greater St. Petersburg, Fla.,
608 F. Supp. 972, 977 (M.D. Fla. 1985) (finding that "a technical truth, in essence,
can be as misleading as an outright truth where it paints an incomplete picture").
14. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681b (c)(1)(B), 1681m(d).
15. The statute defines the term "firm offer of credit or insurance" as "any
offer of credit or insurance to a consumer that will be honored if the consumer is
determined, based on information in a consumer report on the consumer, to meet the
specific criteria used to select the consumer for the offer," but the offer may be
further conditioned on one or more of the criteria covered in the statute. 15 U.S.C. §
168 1a(l).
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from misusing prescreened lists. 16 Although some courts have been
quite liberal in deciding on the firmness of a lender's offer, 17 some
have also been concerned about whether an offer of credit must have
value for the consumer. 18 This article will review the requirements for
a firm offer of credit in light of the approaches the courts have taken.
On another front, a consumer is always curious to know why a
creditor has turned down his application for credit. The Equal Credit
Opportunity Act (ECOA) requires a creditor to give its reasons for
taking adverse action on a consumer's application. 19 Sometimes the
reasons are not clear and a creditor may find itself having to explain
what it meant, because the evidence shows that the creditor was
decidedly vague in communicating its rejection. 20 The courts have
been eager to hold creditors accountable for their ambiguity, without
requiring them to craft some long, detailed statement that might
further confuse the consumer. 21 After all, the objective is to provide
16. See Cole v. U.S. Capital, 389 F.3d 719, 728 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding a
prescreened offer of credit was really a solicitation to sell cars); McDonald v.
NextStudent, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d 956, 962 (E.D. Mo. 2008) (denying summary
judgment to defendant where its mailer did not show it was an offer of credit).
17. See Cavin v. Home Loan Ctr., Inc., 531 F.3d 526, 531 (7th Cir. 2008)
(holding that lender made firm offer of credit despite absence of some material
terms); Poehl v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 528 F.3d 1093, 1099 (8th Cir.
2008) (holding that lender did not violate FCRA by accessing consumers' credit
reports because test for offer of credit is whether it is firm according to the statute
and not whether it is valuable); Sullivan v. Greenwood Credit Union, 520 F.3d 70,
76 (1st Cir. 2008) (holding the phrase "firm offer of credit" did not require lender to
include terms other than prescreened criteria).
18. See Poehl, 528 F.3d at 1099; Murray v. New Cingular Wireless Servs.,
Inc., 523 F.3d 719, 721 (7th Cir. 2008); Dixon v. Shamrock Fin. Corp., 522 F.3d 76,
82 (1st Cir. 2008); Cole, 389 F.3d at 726.
19. See 15 U.S.C. § 1691(d)(2)-(3) (2006); 12 C.F.R. § 202.9(a)(2), (b)(2)
(2009).
20. See Stoyanovich v. Fine Art Capital L.L.C., No. 06 Civ. 13158(SHS),
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60793, at *15-17 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2007); Higgins v. J.C.
Penney, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 722 (E.D. Mo. 1986)
21. See Fischl v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 708 F.2d 143, 147 (5th Cir.
1983) (holding that language "credit references are insufficient" did not satisfy
requirement for creditor to give specific reasons); Carroll v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 434
F. Supp. 557, 562 (E.D. La. 1977) (holding that creditor failed to satisfy requirement
of specific reasons for denial where it listed only one of more than five factors). But
cf. Williams v. MBNA Am. Bank, N.A., 538 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1020 (E.D. Mich.
2008) (holding that the reasons given that the consumer had sufficient balances on
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the consumer with enough information so that he may, if he wants,
take the necessary steps to repair his credit record, and not be left in
the dark about his deficiencies. 22 It is also important to determine
whether an organization that is not the actual lender in a transaction, a
dealer, may still be a creditor for purposes of the statute, so that it has
an obligation to give notice of any adverse action. The cases will show
that it depends on the extent of the dealer's involvement in the
transaction. 23 With respect to adverse action, it involves more than a
rejection for a loan. 24 It even includes the decision of an insurance
company to charge a consumer a higher premium on the basis of a
consumer report. 25 The higher premium may be regarded as an
increase even if the premium is for initial coverage, and not for a
policy renewal.26 It is relevant, therefore, to review how an increase in
an insurance premium can result in an adverse action, when a
consumer is paying his premium for the first time.

her line of credit and that she had sufficient credit available in light of her income
were specific enough to satisfy requirement).
A Senate Report noted, however, that Congress did not intend to require "statements
of reasons be given in the form of long, detailed personal letters" but that a short
checklist statement will be sufficient so long as it reasonably indicates the reasons
for adverse action." S. REP. No. 94-589, at 8 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 403, 410. In Williams v. MBNA America Bank, N.A., the plaintiff
found the creditor's reasons for rejecting her application "incoherent" and
"illogical," arguing that they were not clearly and conspicuously explained. 538 F.
Supp. at 1020-21. The court noted that there was no such requirement in the statute
or the regulation relating to the content of an adverse action notice. Id. at 1021. The
"clear and conspicuous" requirement in the regulation relates to the format of
disclosures. See 12 C.F.R. § 202.4(d) (2009).
22. See Treadway v. Gateway Chevrolet Oldsmobile, Inc., 362 F.3d 971, 977
(7th Cir. 2004); Aikens v. Nw. Dodge, Inc., No. 03C7956, 2006 WL 59408, at *2
(N.D. Ill. Jan.5, 2006); Fischl, 708 F.2d at 146.
23. See Treadway, 362 F.3d at 979 (7th Cir. 2004); Henry v. Westchester
Foreign Auto, Inc., 522 F. Supp. 2d 610, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); Bamette v. Brook
Road Inc., 457 F. Supp. 2d 647, 654 (E.D. Va. 2006); Kivel v. Wealthspring
Mortgage Corp., 398 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1053-54 (D. Minn. 2005)
24. See 15 U.S.C § 1681a(k)(1) (2006). The FCRA requires that a person give
notice to a consumer about any adverse action "based in whole or in part on any
information contained in a consumer report." Id. § 1681m(a).
25. See Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Geico Gen. Ins. Co., 551 U.S. 47, 62-63
(2007).
26. See id. at 63.
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II. ACCURACY IN CREDIT REPORTING

A. The ProperStandard
A consumer reporting agency does not have strict liability under
the FCRA for preparing

inaccurate reports. 2 7 It must "follow

reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy" in
reporting information about a consumer. 28 At first blush, the
"accuracy" requirement does not seem problematic, but a technically
accurate report may turn out to be misleading. 29 In that event, there
may be some doubt whether the agency has fulfilled its obligation,
inasmuch as its report may not tell the whole story about the
consumer. 30 If an agency's report is inaccurate under this standard, the
consumer may at least challenge the reasonableness of the agency's
procedures, even if the report meets the test of technical accuracy. The
statute requires a consumer reporting agency to aim for "maximum
possible accuracy;" therefore, the agency's report should be measured
against this standard. 3 ' If the agency has done all that it could
27. See Spence v. TRW, Inc., 92 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 1996); Henson v.
CSC Credit Servs., 29 F.3d 280, 284 (7th Cir. 1994); Cahlin v. Gen. Motors
Acceptance Corp., 936 F.2d 1151, 1156 (1 1th Cir. 1991); Thompson v. San Antonio
Retail Merchants Assoc., 682 F.2d 509, 513 (5th Cir. 1982); Schmitt v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, N.A. No. 03-3295 ADM/AJB, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18029, at
*9 (D. Minn. August 23, 2005); Anderson v. Trans Union L.L.C., 345 F. Supp. 2d
963,970 (W.D. Wis. 2004).
28. 15 U.S.C. § 168le(b) (2006).
29. See Dalton v. Capital Associated Indus., Inc., 257 F.3d 409, 415 (4th Cir.
2001) (stating that "[a] report is inaccurate when it is 'patently incorrect' or when it
is 'misleading in such a way and to such an extent that it can be expected to [have
an] adverse []' effect") (quoting Supulvado v. CSC Credit Servs., 158 F.3d 890, 895
(5th Cir. 1998); Pinner v. Schmidt, 805 F.2d 1258, 1262-63 (5th Cir. 1986) (finding
a consumer report inaccurate when it described an account as "litigation pending,"
when it was the consumer that brought the suit).
30. See Dalton, 257 F.3d at 416 (finding that jury could reasonably conclude
from the report that individual was guilty of a felony although he had pleaded guilty
to misdemeanor); Pinner,805 F.2d at 1262 (finding liability where consumer report
that indicated "litigation pending" could be interpreted as a consumer being sued
instead of bringing suit); Alexander v. Moore & Assocs., Inc., 553 F. Supp. 948, 952
(D. Haw. 1982) (finding liability where consumer report indicated failure to pay
cleaning costs to landlord as a bad credit experience).
31. Section 1681e(b) provides that "[w]henever a consumer reporting agency
prepares a consumer report it shall follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum
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reasonably do to meet that standard, then it has a legitimate defense
32
against the consumer for any resulting inaccuracy.
It is not enough for an agency simply to act as a conduit by
passing on information provided by its customers. 33 Under some
circumstances, an agency may find itself in trouble when it continues
to report information that a consumer has disputed. When information
is disputed, it is no defense for the agency to say it has reported what
the creditor had in its records. 34 The creditor's information may be
accurate in the sense that the creditor is accurately reporting the
content of the consumer's record. But the information that a creditor
has in its database about a consumer may be inaccurate, and when the
agency is aware of the data's unreliability, it must exercise caution in
35
reporting the information to its subscribers.
An agency's report that is technically true can be as damaging as a
false report if it paints a misleading picture. 36 The FCRA encourages
an agency to present a full picture of a consumer's record, and not
merely report the bare essentials in order to be technically accurate. If
it were otherwise, the statute would not require a consumer reporting
agency to strive for "maximum possible accuracy" in its consumer

possible accuracy of the information concerning the individual about whom the
report relates." 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b).
32. See DeAndrade v. Trans Union L.L.C., 523 F.3d 61, 67 (1st Cir. 2008);
Podell v. Citicorp Diners Club, Inc., 112 F.3d 98, 105 (2d Cir. 1997); Philbin v.
Trans Union Corp., 101 F.3d 957, 963-64 (3rd Cir. 1996); Henson v. CSC Credit
Servs., 29 F.3d 280, 284 (7th Cir. 1994); Cahlin, 936 F.2d at 1156; Bryant v. TRW,
Inc., 689 F.2d 72, 78 (6th Cir. 1982).
33. Cushman v. Trans Union Corp., 115 F.3d 220, 224-25 (3d Cir. 1997);
Bryant, 689 F.2d at 77; Crane v. Trans Union, L.L.C., 282 F. Supp. 2d 311, 317
(E.D. Pa. 2003).
34. See Dalton, 257 F.3d at 417; Bryant, 689 F.2d at 78; Poore v. Sterling
Testing Sys., Inc., 410 F. Supp. 2d 557, 571 (E.D. Ky. 2006).
35. See Graham v. CSC Credit Servs., Inc., 306 F. Supp. 2d 873, 878 (D.
Minn. 2004); Thomas v. Gulf Coast Credit Serv. Inc., 214 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1234
(M.D. Ala. 2002); NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., FAIR CREDIT REPORTING § 4.4.6.3
(6th ed. 2006) [hereinafter FAIR CREDIT REPORTING].
36. See Gorman v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 552 F.3d 1008, 1023 (9th
Cir. 2009); Saunders v. Branch Banking & Trust Co. of Va., 526 F.3d 142. 148 (4th
Cir. 2008); Sepulvado v. CSC Credit Servs. 158 F.3d 890, 895 (5th Cir. 1998);
Swoager v. Credit Bureau of Greater St. Petersburg, 608 F. Supp. 972, 977 (M.D.
Fla. 1985).
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reports. 37 This language suggests the drafters were not willing to settle
for a narrow definition of accuracy. 38 Instead, it suggests that an
agency should do everything within its control to achieve the statutory
objective, and not leave out information that would lead to a different
conclusion about the report. The statute's legislative history supports
this approach, for Senator Proxmire's exchange with Senator Bennett
during congressional deliberations drove home the point that a report
that a consumer had been charged with assault could hardly be
accurate in the statutory sense when the report failed to mention that
the charge was dismissed because the consumer went to the defense of
an elderly person who was being attacked. 39 The "technical accuracy"
approach would sustain that kind of reporting because the attacker had
indeed sued the consumer for assault. Nevertheless, if the report
stopped there, one would hardly know that instead of being a villain,
the consumer had become a hero in coming to the aid of an elderly
40
victim.
The failings of the "technical accuracy" defense also appear when
an agency reports a consumer's joint account as "included in
bankruptcy" simply because the other joint owner had filed for
bankruptcy. A creditor could not be faulted for rejecting a credit
application on the basis of that information, since it would be relying
on the agency's message that the consumer was somehow involved in
a bankruptcy proceeding. 4 ' It is plain that a report of this kind cries
out for some explanation, because the bare reference to a bankruptcy
leads the reader to believe that the subject of the report has been
involved in some way with a proceeding that has a negative impact on
his credit.

37. See 15 U.S.C. § 168le(b) (2006).

38. See Dalton, 257 F.3d at 415; Henson v. CSC Credit Servs., 29 F.3d 280,
284 (7th Cir. 1994); Koropoulos v. Credit Bureau, Inc., 734 F.2d 37, 40 (D.C. Cir.
1984); Alexander v. Moore & Assocs., Inc., 553 F. Supp. 948 (D. Haw. 1982).
39. Fair Credit Reporting: Hearings on S.823 Before the Subcomm. on Fin.
Institutions of the S. Banking and Currency Comm., 91st Cong. 34 (1969)

[hereinafter Senate Hearingson FairCredit Reporting].
40. See FAIR CREDIT REPORTING, supra note 35, § 4.2.3.
41. See Dickens v. Trans Union Corp., 18 F. App'x 315 (6th Cir. 2001);
Johnson v. Equifax. Inc., 510 F. Supp. 2d 638 (S.D. Ala. 2007); Heupel v. Trans
Union, 193 F. Supp. 2d 1234 (N.D. Ala. 2002).
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In the same vein, it is certainly more desirable from a consumer's
point of view for an agency to report that a consumer has subsequently
satisfied his debt even after the creditor has charged off the account. A
consumer reporting agency should have every incentive to report
information that may correct any misleading impressions conveyed by
the correct identification of a charged-off account. In this situation no
one can dispute the fact that the creditor has charged off the debt, but
it would also be desirable, in the interest of completeness, for an
agency to report that the consumer subsequently satisfied the debt.42
By the same token, it is disconcerting that a reporting agency would
report that a consumer had also declared bankruptcy, but fail to add
that the consumer had withdrawn his bankruptcy petition and repaid
his outstanding debt.43 These cases raise the problem of having
incomplete information in a report and suggest that incompleteness is
44
a component of inaccuracy.
Although the word "completeness" does not appear in § 168le(b),
it is included in § 1681i dealing with an agency's obligation to
reinvestigate when a consumer raises questions about the
completeness or accuracy of any item in his file.4 5 The missing term in
§ 168le(b) leaves doubts about congressional intent, since it is
arguable that Congress did not intend to recognize completeness as an

42. See Henson, 29 F.3d 280; Koropoulos, 734 F.2d 37; Evantash v. G.E.

Mortgage Servs., Inc., No. 02-CV-1188, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12131 (E.D. Pa.
Nov. 25, 2003).
43. See McPhee v. Chilton Corp. 468 F. Supp. 494 (D. Conn. 1978); Todd v.
Associated Credit Bureau Servs., Inc., 451 F. Supp. 447 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd mem.,
578 F.2d 1376 (3d Cir. 1978).
44. Senator Proxmire observed that if a consumer report indicated that a
consumer was delinquent, but also failed to report that the creditor had agreed to the
consumer's slow payments because of extenuating circumstances, that would be
incomplete information. 115 CONG. REc. 2411 (1969) (remarks of Sen. Proxmire).
During the congressional hearings, some congressmen seemed to regard "accuracy"
and "completeness" as synonyms. See 116 CONG. REc. 36569-73 (remarks of Rep.
Sullivan); Senate Hearings on FairCredit Reporting, supra note 39, at 34 (remarks

of Sen. Bennett).
45. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) (2006) (requiring a consumer reporting
agency to use reasonable procedures to achieve "maximum possible accuracy"),
with id. § 1681i (requiring a consumer reporting agency to reinvestigate if a
consumer disputes the "completeness or accuracy" of any item of information).
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essential element of accuracy. 4 6 Congress must have intended to create
some role for completeness when it drafted § 1681i. The statute
requires an agency to delete inaccurate information from the
consumer's file. That is understandable, given the damage that
inaccurate information can cause to a consumer's credit. There may,
however, be information that is missing from the consumer's file and
deletion would not be the proper remedy for that problem. 48 In that
event, the agency should make amends by completing the file with the
missing information. This would not be inconsistent with recognizing
the "completeness" element in § 1681e(b). 49 The reference in § 1681i
simply clarifies that in addition to deleting misleading information, a

46. The court in Koropoulos v. Credit Bureau, Inc. suggested that a reference
to "completeness" may have been omitted in § 1681e(b) because the section was
added late in the legislative process and there was no time to reconcile it with earlier
versions. 734 F.2d 37, 44 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Section 1681e(b) was added late in the
process during conference deliberations at the insistence of the House conferees. See
116 CONG. REc. 36,570 (1970) (statement of Rep. Sullivan).
47. The reinvestigation provision requires a consumer reporting agency to
"promptly delete that item of information" which the agency finds to be inaccurate.
15 U.S.C § 1681i(a)(5)(A)(i) (2006).
48. The statute recognizes that a reinvestigation could show that the
information in the consumer's file is "inaccurate or incomplete." Id. § 1681i(5)(A).
The agency can delete an inaccuracy, but dealing with incompleteness requires
something else. This is why the drafters went to the trouble of covering explicitly
both inaccuracy and incompleteness in the reinvestigation provision. See id.;
Koropoulos, 734 F.2d at 44.
49. In introducing the legislation, Senator Proxmire specifically dealt with the
problem of incomplete information as an element of inaccuracy. He observed that
"because of the increased computerization and standardization of credit bureau files,
all of the relevant information is not always reflected in a person's files." 115 CONG.
REC. 2411 (1969) (remarks of Sen. Proxmire). The House Conference Report also
gave an idea that § 168le(b) covered both incomplete and misleading reports
through the following explanation:
The House conferees intend that this requirement [to follow reasonable
procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy] shall include the duty to
differentiate between types of individual bankruptcies (e.g. between
straight bankruptcies and chapter XIII wage earner plans), and that
disposition of a wage earner plan where the consumer conscientiously
carries out his responsibilities under it should be duly noted.
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 91-1587, at 29 (1970), reprintedin 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4411,
4415.
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reporting agency must also include missing information that will
contribute to a fuller understanding of the consumer's record.
This is not to say that an agency should be chastised for rendering
an incomplete report that is not misleading. It is entirely reasonable to
accept completeness as a component of accuracy without demanding
completeness itself as a requirement, if the agency has provided a
report that satisfies the criterion of maximum possible accuracy. After
all, the statute strives for a full picture of the record that tells the
whole story about the consumer. Nevertheless, the information must
be relevant to that objective, and so it is not necessary to demand
completeness from the reporting agency if there is no compromise on
50
accuracy.
III. DUTY TO REINVESTIGATE
A. The Agency's Obligation
If a consumer disputes the accuracy or completeness of a report,
the reporting agency must conduct a reasonable reinvestigation to
determine whether there is a problem.51 A consumer has a basis for a
claim under § 168 1i only if the information in the consumer's file is in
fact inaccurate. 52 When the consumer in DeAndrade v. Trans Union
L.L.C. 53 challenged the agency's report about an outstanding
mortgage, the consumer's allegation of fraud with respect to the
mortgage did not change the fact that the mortgage documents of
record were what informed the agency's report. 54 A reinvestigation
would not have changed the result. The consumer reporting agency
saw a recorded mortgage and reported that information. 55 It was not
within its portfolio to delve into the transaction in order to determine
50. In Sepulvado v. Credit Servs., Inc. the Fifth Circuit declined "to construe §
1681e(b) in a way that would require completeness without regard to whether the
disputed entry was misleading." 158 F.3d 890, 896 (5th Cir. 1998).
51. 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(1)(A) (2006).
52. DeAndre v. Trans Union L.L.C., 523 F.3d 61, 67 (lst Cir. 2008); Dennis v.
BEH-l, L.L.C., 520 F.3d 1066, 1069 (9th Cir. 2008); Williams v. Colonial Bank,
826 F. Supp. 415, 418 (M.D. Ala. 1993).
53. 523 F.3d 61 (1st Cir. 2008).
54. See id. at 68.
55. See id.
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the arrangement between the parties. This would have opened the way
for a collateral attack on the mortgage itself, an assignment that the
FCRA does not contemplate for the reporting agency.
The important question is whether the consumer reporting agency
could have uncovered any inaccuracy if it had reinvestigated the
matter.5 6 Nevertheless, when a consumer informs a consumer
reporting agency of some inaccuracy in a report, the agency should
not merely confirm the accuracy of the information with the original
source. 57 The statute's recognition of an agency's "grave
responsibilities" for reporting accurate information 58 suggests that an
agency cannot simply repeat the disputed information in a report after
a creditor's perfunctory confirmation. When a consumer notifies the
reporting agency that a source may be unreliable, or if the agency
should be aware of that possibility, the agency has a duty to go beyond
the original source in order to resolve the dispute. 59 It is also important
to weigh the cost of reinvestigating the matter against the possible
harm that may fall to the consumer as a result of any inaccurately
60
reported information.

56. See id. at 68; Cushman v. Trans Union Corp., 115 F.3d 220, 226 (3d Cir.
1997).
57. See Cushman, 115 F.3d 220; Henson v. CSC Credit Servs., 29 F.3d 280,
286-87 (7th Cir. 1994); Stevenson v. TRW Inc., 987 F2d 288, 293 (5th Cir. 1993).

58. Congress found a "need to insure that consumer reporting agencies
exercise their grave responsibilities with fairness, impartiality, and a respect for the
consumer's right to privacy." 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(4) (2006).
59. See Stevenson, 987 F.2d at 293 (explaining that in reinvestigating the
accuracy of a credit report, a credit reporting agency "must bear some responsibility
for evaluating the accuracy of information obtained from subscribers"); Lambert v.
Beneficial Mortgage Corp., No. 3:05-cv-05 468-RBL, 2007 WL 1309542, at *5
(W.D. Wash. May 4, 2007) (stating that an agency's use of a customer dispute
verification form does not relieve a consumer reporting agency from the obligation
of verifying the accuracy of its initial source of information); Cairns v. GMAC
Mortgage Corp., No. CIV 04-1840-PHX-SMM, 2007 WL 735564, at *6 (D. Ariz.

Mar. 5, 2007) (stating that statutory obligation to reinvestigate "must necessarily
consist of something more than parroting information received from the original
sources"); White v. Trans Union, 462 F. Supp. 2d 1079, 1083 (C.D. Cal. 2006)

(rejecting the theory that as a matter of law a reasonable reinvestigation requires
only confirmation of the accuracy of information from an original source).
60. See Cushman, 115 F.3d at 225; Henson, 29 F.3d at 287.
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In Cushman v. Trans Union Corp.,6 1 the reporting agency did not

discharge its responsibility. It simply confirmed whether the lender
had issued some credit cards in the name of the consumer. The
consumer was not questioning whether the cards had been issued in
her name. She was concerned instead with the fraudulent use of the
cards issued to an unknown person in her name, so it was not enough
for the reporting agency merely to satisfy itself that the cards bore her
name. 62 Having been informed of the consumer's misgivings, the
agency then had a responsibility to dig deeper for an answer. 63 The
agency's obligation was no different in Henson v. CSC Credit
Services,64 where the consumer disputed the existence of a judgment
against him.65 The reporting agency relied on the court's judgment
docket that contained the erroneous information. 66 It is understandable
that the agency had confidence in the judgment docket, but once the
consumer raised doubts about its accuracy, the agency should then
have reinvestigated the matter. It knew the extent of the consumer's
query, so there was no question of unreasonable use of resources to
67
respond to the consumer's dispute.
Even if a reporting agency relies on another party to review a
consumer's court file in order to determine whether the disputed
information is accurate or not, in the final analysis the agency is
responsible for any deficiencies in the search process. It all relates

61. Cushman, 115 F.3d 220.
62. See id. at 222.
63. See id. at 224.
64. 29 F.3d 280 (7th Cir. 1994).
65. Id. at 283.
66. See id. at 285.
67. The consumers survived the defendants' motion to dismiss their complaint
under § 1681i because a consumer reporting agency may not rely exclusively on
public court documents once it is informed that the consumer disputes the
information in his credit report. See id. at 286. The notice to the agency gives the
agency the opportunity to "target its resources in a more efficient manner and
conduct a more thorough investigation." Id. at 286-87. To determine a credit
reporting agency's duty, the court will balance the cost of verifying the accuracy of
the source against the possible harm that the consumer may suffer because of the
inaccurate reporting of the information. Id. at 287.
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back to the requirement of a "reasonable reinvestigation." 68 There was
nothing unusual in Dennis v. BEH-169 that caused the reporting
agency to overlook the entry in the consumer's court file, that
reflected dismissal of the action against the consumer. The agency's
investigator either overlooked the document or did not understand its
legal effect, for he confirmed the entry of a judgment against the
consumer.7 ° The reporting agency placed its confidence in the
subcontractor that it had employed to review the matter, but in the
final analysis it was up to the agency to determine the legal effect of
the stipulation to which the parties had agreed.
B. The ReinvestigationReport
Once a consumer reporting agency has completed its
reinvestigation, it must notify the consumer about the result in writing
within five business days.71 It must also provide a "consumer report
that is based upon the consumer's file as that file is revised as a result
of the reinvestigation. ' 72 The ambiguity of the statutory language
raises the question whether the reporting agency must provide the
consumer's complete file or merely a report about the revisions to that
file. The statute calls for a consumer report that is based on the revised
file, so that the report covered in § 1681i(a)(6)(B)(ii) cannot be the
same as the consumer's file. In Nunnally v. Equifax Information
Services, L.L. C.,73 the Eleventh Circuit explained that the consumer's
revised file is the basis for the consumer report that is required after
the reinvestigation, and that the phrase "as that file is revised" really

68. 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(1)(A) (2006); see also Cahlin v. Gen. Motors
Acceptance Corp., 936 F.2d 1151, 1160 (11 th Cir. 1991); FAIR CREDIT REPORTING,
supra note 35, § 4.5.3.3.
69. Dennis v. BEH-1, L.L.C., 520 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2008).
70. See Dennis, 520 F.3d at 1070. The agency misinterpreted the written
stipulation between the parties as an entry of judgment. In fact the stipulation
evidenced an agreement between the consumer and his landlord that no judgment
would be entered against the consumer as long the consumer complied with the
payment schedule. See id.
71. 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(6)(A).
72. Id. § 1681i(a)(6)(B)(ii).
73. Nunnally v. Equifax Info. Servs., L.L.C., 451 F.3d 768 (lth Cir. 2006).
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highlights the place from which the consumer report originated.7 4 The
revisions are the key to the consumer report.
One wonders, however, whether the drafters could have avoided
the Nunnally-type problem by simplifying the post-reinvestigation
obligation of a consumer reporting agency. Surely the drafters could
have insisted on a single report of the results of the reinvestigation that
would include the revisions that ensued therefrom. The choice of
having the consumer report as "part of, or in addition to" the notice
about the results of the reinvestigation leaves the inquiry open to
speculation that the consumer may expect more than the statute
requires. 75 The consumer's main interest is in ascertaining how his
dispute has changed his record, and so the consumer should find it
easier to understand what has happened if the consumer reporting
agency produces a report that tells the whole story once the
reinvestigation has concluded.7 6 This does not mean, however, that the
current language requires disclosure of the complete file.
There are other references to a consumer's file in other sections of
the statute. For example, under § 1681g(a)(1) a consumer reporting
agency must disclose "[a]ll information in the consumer's file" on the
consumer's request. 7 7 The Federal Trade Commission must prepare a
summary of consumer's rights under § 1681g(a)(1)(B) and that
summary includes the consumer's fight to obtain "a copy of a
consumer report under subsection (a).", 7 8 The reference in subsection
(c)(1)(B) that links a "consumer report" to "all information in the
consumer's file" in subsection (a)(1) suggests that the drafters were
referring to a consumer's complete file in both subsections. 79 The
reinvestigation requirements in § 168li(a)(6)(B)(ii) do not mention
anything about § 1681i(a) dealing with a consumer's complete file,
but instead employ different language that calls for a consumer report

74. Id. at 776.

75. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681 i(a)(6)(B) (2006).
76. The consumer might find it easier to relate the results of the reinvestigation
to the post-reinvestigation report if they are both contained in the same document.
This would require, therefore, a deletion of the language "or in addition to" in §

1681 i(a)(6)(B).
77. 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a)(1) (2006).
78. Id. § 1681g(c)(1)(B)(i).
79. Compare id. § 1681g(a)(1) with id. § 1681(c)(1)(B)(i).
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based on the consumer's file as revised. 80 This language is certainly
not equivalent to "[a]ll information in the consumer's file," a phrase
81
that is the hallmark of § 168 1g(a)(1).
Section 168lj is another provision that refers to a consumer's
complete file. It gives a consumer the right to obtain a free copy of his

file every year pursuant to § 1681g. 82 Section 1681j leaves no doubt
that the free copy must be of all information in the consumer's file
because it refers specifically to "all disclosures pursuant to section

168 1g."8 3 If the drafters had wanted something more for the consumer
in § 1681i(a)(6)(B)(ii), they could easily have made the same linkage
to § 1681g(a)(1) that they did when they dealt with § 1681j. 84 It looks
like a deliberate attempt to make a distinction between a reporting
agency's duties after reinvestigation and the consumer's right to
demand his complete file in any event. The reinvestigation causes the
parties to focus on the consumer's specific complaint, and it is
understandable, therefore, that § 1681i(a)(6)(B)(ii) would not broaden
the disclosures to include the consumer's complete file. The
communication that follows an agency's reinvestigation should ideally
highlight the changes to the consumer's file that ensue from the
consumer's dispute. 85 Nevertheless, the drafters could have made it
easier for consumers by merely requiring a single, post-reinvestigation
communication that not only gives the results of the agency's efforts,
80. See id. § 168 1(i)(a)(6)(B)(ii).
81. See id. § 1681g(a)(1).
82. Id. § 1681j(a)(1)(A).
83. Id. Among the disclosures covered by § 1681g is the information in the
consumer's file.
84. Compare id. § 1681i(a)(6)(B)(ii) (requiring "a consumer report that is
based upon the consumer's file as that file is revised as a result of the
reinvestigation"), with id. § 1681j(a)(1)(A) (requiring disclosures pursuant to §
1681g once during any 12-month period without cost to the consumer).
85. In Nunnally v. Equifax Information Services, the Eleventh Circuit observed
that an agency's revisions may not be apparent to the consumer if the agency sends
him his complete file after a reinvestigation. 451 F.3d 768, 776 (11th Cir. 2006).
The court believed that the summary letters that the consumer reporting agency sent
to the consumers were more effective in highlighting the changes made. See id. One
authority has indicated that two national consumer agencies, Equifax and Experian,
only provide information about the specific matters that were investigated, instead of

providing a consumer's complete file. See FAIR CREDIT
§ 4.6.1.
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but also that highlights the changes. This procedure would avoid the
consumer's expectation of a full-fledged consumer file which might
be implied from the reference to a separate consumer report in
subsection (6)(B)(ii).
This confusion over a consumer's file may arise in another
context. A consumer reporting agency must disclose at the consumer's
request "all information in the consumer's file." 86 When the
consumers made their request in Gillespie v. Trans Union
Corporation,87 they did not get what they had hoped for, since the
purge date was missing from the reporting agency's disclosure. 88 The
question then became whether the term "file" mentioned in
§1681g(a)(1) covered everything in the consumer file held by Trans
Union, or whether it referred only to data in a consumer report that
Trans Union issued to third parties. 89 If the former, then Trans Union
had to include the purge date in the information that it provided to the
consumer. The Seventh Circuit opted for the latter approach, 90 relying
on the FTC Official Staff Commentary, which limits the term "file" to
information "that might be furnished, or has been furnished, in a
91
consumer report on [the] consumer."
The court observed that if the file referred to in § 1681g(a)(1)
covered everything that the consumer reporting agency held in the
consumer's name, then it would not have been necessary to identify
other categories of information in subsections (a)(2)-(6) that the
consumer could request from the reporting agency. 92 By giving §
168 1g(a)(1) a narrower focus, the court purported to accommodate the
other subsections, fearing that it could not avoid their redundancy if it

86. 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a)(1).
87. Gillespie v. Trans Union Corp., 482 F.3d 907, 908 (7th Cir. 2007).
88. See id. at 908. The purge date is the date when the consumer reporting
agency removes from its reports any information about a consumer's delinquency.
Id.
89. Section 1681g(a)(1)(A) refers to "[a]ll information in the consumer's file."
90. See Gillespie, 482 F.3d at 909.
91. Commentary on the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 16 C.F.R. pt. 600 app., §
603(g)-2 (2009). The Commentary contains interpretations of the FCRA by Federal
Trade Commission. It does not have the effect of regulations, and the FTC updates
the Commentary from time to time. See 16 C.F.R. pt. 600 app., Introduction 1.4.
92. See Gillespie, 482 F.3d at 909.
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gave subsection (a)(1) an all-inclusive label.93 There is nothing in the
statute that restricts the material in a consumer's file to information
relating only to a consumer report. A file comprises "all of the
information on [the] consumer recorded and retained by a consumer
reporting agency regardless of how the information is stored," 94 and
an agency must disclose "all information" in that file if the consumer
requests it.95 If the drafters intended to restrict the disclosure to
matters in a consumer report, they could have limited the reporting
agency's obligation to information of the kind covered in §
1681a(d)(1), 96 a category that lacks the comprehensive features of §
1681g(a)(1). There may be some concern that if the information
demanded through § 1681g(a)(1) includes everything relating to the
for
consumer, then the additional paragraphs of the section allowing
97
the disclosure of additional information becomes redundant.
First of all, it is conceivable that a consumer may be interested
only in a specific item instead of his complete file, and § 1681g
therefore gives him the option to choose his area of inquiry.
Furthermore, while subsection (a)(1) covers all information in the file
at the time of the [consumer's] request, subsection (a)(4) allows the
consumer to request information about checks relating to any adverse
characterization of the consumer that are in the consumer's file at the
time of the disclosure.98 It is conceivable, therefore, that information
about checks may not be in the file when the consumer makes his
request for all information under subsection (a)(1), but it may be there
when the reporting agency makes its disclosure pursuant to subsection
(a)(4). The consumer's request under subsection (a)(1) would not,
therefore, make subsection (a)(4) redundant in the scheme of things.
The same thing may be said about subsection (a)(5) which requires a
reporting agency to disclose on the consumer's request all information
93.
94.

See id.
15 U.S.C. § 1681a(g) (2006).

95. Id. § 1681g(a)(1).
96. Section 1681a(d) defines "consumer report" by relating it to certain
information about the consumer's reputation and credit standing that is used to
establish the consumer's eligibility for purposes identified in the statute. 15 U.S.C.
§ 168la(d)(1). The limiting language of this section must be contrasted with the
broad language of § 1681g(a)(1) that covers all information in the consumer's file.
97. See Gillespie, 482 F.3d at 909.
98. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a)(1) with 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a)(4).
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about third-party inquiries concerning the consumer that took place in
the one-year period preceding the consumer's request for disclosure. 99
A consumer could request all information in his file, but yet not have
access to all inquiries about him that preceded his request for
information. The drafters left nothing to chance in ensuring that with
respect to third-party inquiries about the consumer, the reporting
agency would have to take a retrospective look to satisfy the demands
of subsection (a)(5); that would satisfy the historical element of that
subsection without affecting the vitality of subsection (a)(1).
IV. USE OF PRESCREENED LISTS FOR OFFERS OF CREDIT

A. The Strategy
Congress passed the FCRA "to ensure fair and accurate credit
reporting, promote efficiency in the banking system, and protect
consumer privacy." 100 As a result of the role that credit reporting
agencies play in reporting information about consumers, creditors are
able to make intelligent decisions about consumer credit without fear
of compromising the privacy concerns of their customers. When
Congress amended the FCRA in 1996 to allow creditors to buy from
credit reporting agencies prescreened lists of persons who met certain
10 1
criteria for credit, it presented another challenge for creditors.

99. See id. § 1681g(a)(5).
100. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 52 (2007) (citing 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681). Senator Proxmire gave some idea of the rationale for enacting the FCRA:
The aim of the Fair Credit Reporting Act is to see that the credit reporting
system serves the consumer as well as it serves the industry. The
consumer has a right to information which is accurate; he has a right to
correct inaccurate or misleading information; he has a right to know when
inaccurate information is entered into his file; he has a right to see that the
information is kept confidential and is used for the purpose for which it is
collected; and he has a right to be free from unwarranted invasions of his
personal privacy. The Fair Credit Reporting Act seeks to secure these
rights.
Senate Hearingson Fair Credit Reporting (statement of Sen. Proxmire), supra note

39.
101.

See Consumer Credit Reporting Reform Act of 1996, sec. 2404 (a)(2) §

168 1(c)(1), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-431.
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Creditors could use these prescreened lists only if they planned to
10 2
make a firm offer of credit.
It was predictable that there would be some disagreement about
the meaning of a "firm offer of credit." The statute defines the term as
"any offer of credit.., to a consumer that will be honored if the
consumer is determined, based on information in a report on the
consumer, to meet the specific criteria used to select the consumer for
the offer.. . "03 The offer may be conditioned on certain pre-selected
criteria relating to the consumer's creditworthiness and on the
consumer's continuing ability to satisfy those criteria. 104 Nevertheless,
there is always a question about the amount of information that the
creditor must include in its offer, and whether the offer has some
value for the consumer, or is simply a solicitation the creditor is using
to accomplish other objectives.
B. The Relevance of Value to the Consumer
The Seventh Circuit gave some early indication of the "value"
component in Cole v. U.S. Capital, Inc.10 5 In Cole, the creditor sent
the consumer a mailing informing her that she was eligible for a Visa
or Mastercard with limits to $2,000, as well as for maximum
automobile credit of $19,500.106 The mailing stated that the creditor
did not guarantee the consumer a credit card, but that if the consumer
met certain conditions, the creditor would guarantee a credit line of at
least $300 for the purchase of a vehicle. 107 The creditor was confident
102. See § 1681b(c)(1)(B)(i). A consumer has the right to opt out of such
prescreened lists. Id. § 1681b(e)(1); FAIR CREDrr REPORTING, supra note 35, §
7.3.4.4.
103. 15 U.S.C. § 1681 a(l). It is to be noted that although the offer to someone
on a prescreened list is made because of that person's impressive credit history,
sometimes creditors will target consumers with less than a spectacular record. See
Murray v. E Trade Fin. Corp., No. 05 C 5433, 2006 WL 2054381, at *1 (N.D. Ill.
July 19, 2006) (creditor made offer of credit to consumers with poor credit or
bankruptcy discharges); Murray v. Sunrise Chevrolet Inc., 441 F. Supp. 2d 940, 943
(N.D. Ill.
2006) (creditor made offer of credit to consumers with bankruptcies during
a certain period and consumers with a credit score between 529-629).
104. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(l)(1).
105. Cole v. U.S. Capital, Inc., 389 F.3d 719 (7th Cir. 2004).
106. Id. at 722.
107. Id.at723.
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that the guarantee of any amount of credit would satisfy the
108
requirement that there be a firm offer of credit.
The court was not convinced that a guaranteed nominal amount of
credit would satisfy the definition, for it was more interested in the
offer having sufficient value for the consumer to justify the creditor's
invasion of the consumer's privacy under the pretext of granting
credit. 10 9 In the court's view, an offer of credit that provides no value
to the consumer is more like a solicitation, which the prescreening
process is not intended to accommodate. 110 In determining value, one
consideration is the amount of credit that is involved in the
transaction. But the Cole court also recognized other important

considerations. It could not assess the true value of an offer without
considering such terms as the interest rate, the repayment period, and
the method of assessing interest."' The court could not decide on the
value of the offer without reviewing the essential elements of the
transaction. It was not surprising that the court failed to be impressed
with the small amount of credit available to the consumer, $300, but
even if that amount might have passed the test, the offer limited its use
to the purchase of a vehicle. 112 It was reasonable to query whether this
was really a firm offer of credit or merely a solicitation for the
purchase of a vehicle. If the latter, the creditor should have had no
access to the consumer's records because the consumer stood to derive
no value from the offer of credit."13 Furthermore, although the
108. Id. at 726. The creditor believed that the offer of credit could be as low as
one dollar and still be considered a firm offer of credit. Id.
109. The court wanted to avoid giving a creditor access to a consumer's record
on the basis of some nominal amount of credit. See id. It stated that "[f]rom the
consumer's perspective, an offer of credit without value is the equivalent of an
advertisement or solicitation." Id. at 727. Prescreened offers are not intended for
that. "Congress did not intend to allow access to consumer credit information for
Icatalogs and sales pitches."' Id. (quoting Trans Union Corp. v. FTC, 267 F.3d 1138,
1143 (D.C. Cir. 2001)).
110. See id. at 728; see also FAIR CREDIT REPORTING, supra note 35, § 7.3.4.3.

The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's decision to dismiss the plaintiffs
complaint, because the plaintiffs allegations stated facts that would allow the
plaintiff to show that the offer had no real value. See Cole, 389 F.3d at 728.
111. See id.
112. See id.

113. In allowing a consumer reporting agency to release a consumer's
information for a creditor to extend a firm offer of credit, Congress balanced the
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defendant in Cole had guaranteed a minimum credit line of $300, it
stated later in the offer that "[g]uaranteed approval [was] neither
express nor implied."'1 14 It was not altogether clear, therefore, that the
defendant was prepared to honor the offer of credit or that the
obligation to do so was part of the definition of "firm offer of
credit."1 15 Surely the offer could not be firm if there was doubt about
the creditor's willingness to honor its commitment.
Although the small amount under consideration in Cole made a
difference to the court, it took on added significance because the
6
consumer could use the credit only towards purchase of a vehicle."
The same Seventh Circuit later found value in a credit card limit of
$250, which was lower than the $300 limit considered in Cole. The
court in Perry v. First National Bank'1 7 acknowledged that the limit
was quite low, but was comforted by the fact that the consumer could
use the money to buy anything he wanted, while the consumer in Cole
1 8
was limited to the purchase of a car from a designated dealership.1
Furthermore, in Cole, the credit paled in comparison to the cost of the
vehicle. 1 19 Nevertheless, the consumer in Perry did not have much
money to spend after paying the required fees to the creditor. 121 It was
true that some of those fees were not recurring items, but they were

privacy interests of consumers against the benefit of consumers getting the benefit of
an offer of credit. This is why the statute requires the offer of credit to be firm, so a
creditor cannot use the prescreening process merely to solicit business. See S. REP.
No. 103-209, at 13 (1993).
114. Cole, 389 F.3d at 728.
115. The statute provides in pertinent part that "[tihe term 'firm offer of credit
or insurance' means any offer of credit or insurance to a consumer that will be
honored" if the consumer meets certain criteria. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(l) (2006).
116. Cole, 389 F.3d at 728.
117. Perry v. First Nat'l Bank, 459 F.3d 816 (7th Cir. 2006).
118. Id.at825.
119. The creditor offered the consumer a credit line of "at least three hundred
dollars for the purchase of a vehicle." Cole, 389 F.3d at 723.
120. The court recognized that the creditor's solicitation required consumers to
pay "a significant amount of money in fees, which are quite high in relation to the
credit line offered." Perry, 459 F.3d at 825. In Perry, the consumer had to pay onetime charges of $9 for a processing fee and $119 for an acceptance fee. He also had
to pay $6 monthly for a participation fee and $50 the following year for the annual
membership fee. Id. at 824. Since the minimum credit line was $250, the consumer
did not have much to work with. Id.
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substantial enough to raise a question about the value of the offer. The
court itself observed that the offer was "not an attractive deal for the
21
great majority of consumers."
Nevertheless, the court recognized some redeeming features in the
offer. If the consumer paid off the card each month, he could use as

much as $3,000 for purchases during any one year, while at the same
time establishing his credit. 122 The saving grace in Perry was that the
offer related to credit, no matter how small, and it was not a guise for
peddling a product to the consumer. 12 3 The offer of credit therefore
124
had value as an "extension of credit alone" to the normal consumer,
and that could be determined by ascertaining whether "the four
25
corners of the offer [satisfied] the statutory definition.'
The Seventh Circuit's "four corners" approach has not been
universally accepted. Other courts have not required a creditor's offer
to contain specific information about terms such as interest rates and

126
repayment periods in order for there to be a firm offer of credit.

They are interested only in determining whether a creditor has made
an offer of credit that it will honor once the consumer meets certain
criteria. The FCRA does not demand that a creditor disclose the exact
terms of the consumer's loan at the time it makes the offer because the

121.

Id. at 825; see also Bonner v. Cortrust Bank, N.A. No. 2:05-CV-137,

2006 WL 1980183, at *4 (N.D. Ind. July 12, 2006) (finding that an offer while
plainly a "lousy deal for consumers of credit" was a firm offer); Poehl v.
Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 464 F. Supp. 2d 882, 886 (E.D. Mo. 2006)
(observing that "[i]t is not the court's job to decide whether a particular offer might
be unwise"), aff'd, 528 F.3d 1093 (8th Cir. 2008).
122. Perry, 459 F.3d at 825.
123. This was not enough to convince Judge Evans in his dissent. He observed
that "[i]n Cole, the sales pitch was for a car; in this case, it is for an unconscionably
one-sided financial deal that defies a reasonable concept of sufficient value." Id. at
827 (Evans, J., dissenting).
124. Murray v. GMAC Mortgage Corp., 434 F.3d 948, 955 (7th Cir. 2006).
125. Id. at 956; see also Klutho v. Fourth Fleet Fin. Inc., 529 F. Supp. 2d
1016, 1020 (E.D. Mo. 2007); Hyde v. RDA, Inc., 389 F. Supp. 2d 658, 665 (D. Md.
2005).
126. See Poehl v. Capital One Auto Fin., 528 F.3d 1093, 1098 (8th Cir. 2008);
Dixon v. Shamrock Fin. Corp., 522 F.3d 76, 81 (1st Cir. 2008); Kennedy v. Chase
Manhattan Bank USA, NA, 369 F.3d 833 (5th Cir. 2004).
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statute allows the creditor to attach conditions
thereto that take into
127
account a particular consumer's situation.
The Fifth Circuit gave us a glimpse of its view on a "firm offer of
credit" in Kennedy v. Chase ManhattanBank USA, NA. 128 In that case,
the creditor informed the consumers that they had been approved for129a
credit card, but then denied them credit when they applied for it.
The creditor based its denial on pre-established criteria that did not
appear in the creditor's mailing. 130 The court found that the statute
allowed a creditor to make a conditional firm offer of credit, one that
was based on pre-determined criteria that did not have to be included
in that offer.' 31 From the consumer's perspective, it seemed odd that
an offer could be firm if it was subject to criteria that were absent
from the original language.' 32 The Kennedy court was keen to point
out that the phrase "firm offer of credit" is only a firm offer if the
consumer meets certain criteria previously established by the creditor,
in addition to the permissible verification and collateral
requirements. 133
Although the Kennedy court did not have to sort out the specific
information that a creditor had to include in its offer of credit, other
courts have nevertheless relied on the Kennedy approach in
concluding that the FCRA does not require that a firm offer of credit
must contain such material credit terms as will allow a consumer to
determine from the four corners of the mailing whether the offer is of
value to him. 134 This disagreement with the Seventh Circuit's

127. See Villagran v. Central Ford, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 2d 866, 879 (S.D. Tex.
2007); Crossman v. Chase Bank USA NA, No. 2:07-116-CWH, 2007 WL 2702699,
at *4 (D.S.C. Sept. 12, 2007); Phinn v. Capital One Auto Fin., Inc., 502 F. Supp. 625
(E.D. Mich. 2007); Putkowski v. Irwin Home Equity Corp., 423 F. Supp. 2d 1053
(N.D. Cal. 2006) (concluding that the FCRA allows firm offers to have a range of
rates which may vary based on the recipient).
128.

Kennedy, 369 F.3d 833.

129. Id. at 837.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 842.
132. Id. at 838.
133. Id. at 841.
134. See Poehl v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 528 F.3d 1093 (8th Cir.
2008); Phinn v. Capital One Auto Fin., Inc., 502 F. Supp. 2d 625 (E.D. Mich. 2007);
Putkowski v. Irwin Home Equity Corp., 423 F. Supp. 2d 1053 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
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approach was based on the theory that the statute nowhere requires a
lender to be specific about loan terms, and that it is permissible, for
example, for an offer to contain a range of interest rates without
affecting its firmness in any way. 135 The statute merely provides the
creditor an opportunity to make an offer of credit that it will honor if
the consumer meets certain pre-established criteria. But the statute
goes further by allowing the creditor to condition the offer on the
consumer's fulfillment of additional criteria.1 36 The FCRA therefore
sanctions the creditor's initial invitation to the consumer, but certainly
contemplates further contact between the creditor and the consumer to
1 37
work out the details of the particular loan transaction.'
C. Disagreementon the Definition
The phrase "firm offer of credit" has caused its own difficulties,
for it has produced an occasional query about the possibility of having
a firm offer when the creditor does not yet know about the
possibilities surrounding a particular consumer. In Sullivan v.
Greenwood,138 the consumer tried to convince the First Circuit that the
statutory definition related only to the firmness of an offer and that the
court should rely on the common law to determine whether there has
been an offer of credit. 39 The only problem is that the statutory
definition relates to the entire phrase, "firm offer of credit," and so

135. See Poehl, 528 F.3d at 1098; Dixon v. Shamrock Fin. Corp., 522 F.3d 76,
81 (1st Cir. 2008); Soroka v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 500 F. Supp. 2d 217, 222
(S.D.N.Y. 2007). The court in Dixon observed that the Truth in Lending Act
regulates the disclosure of loan terms and that Regulation Z identifies the specific
disclosures that a lender must make to a borrower in a loan transaction. Dixon, 522
F.3d at 81 (citing Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 and Regulation Z, 12
C.F.R. §§ 226.5(a), 226.5(b)). The mere fact that the Truth in Lending Act and
Regulation Z require specific items to be disclosed in a loan transaction serves as a
contrast to the prescreening mechanism in the FCRA, where the latter does not
require any specific disclosures in the lender's firm offer of credit.
136. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(l) (2006).
137. See Poehl, 528 F.3d at 1097; Sullivan v. Greenwood Credit Union, 520
F.3d 70, 76 (1st Cir. 2008); Hoge v. Parkway Chevrolet, Inc., No. H-05-2686, 2007
WL 3125298 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 23, 2007).
138. Sullivan, 520 F.3d 70.

139. Id. at 75.
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1 40
there is no place for a common law approach in this context.
Therefore, the court was not left to its own devices in trying to conjure
up some definition of the term that would leave room for additional
factors such as interest rates and terms of repayment. Nevertheless, the
question still remains whether the drafters accomplished much by
requiring a creditor's offer to be "firm," when they then allowed it to
be subject to conditions that the consumer must meet in order to
benefit from the offer.
The Kennedy court itself deemed it helpful to explain the
"firmness" element as not being inconsistent with the conditional
nature of a creditor's offer.141 The consumer has a firm offer if he
meets certain criteria. But in Cole, the court was not happy with just
any offer that the creditor would honor. 142 It was interested in looking
at the entire offer and the effect of all its material conditions.1 43 This
was the court's method of determining whether the offer was a
solicitation in disguise, rather than an offer of credit. 144 The court in
Cole was really concerned about whether there was any real prospect
of credit to the consumer. It is one thing to be concerned about the
attractiveness of an offer, but it is quite another to say that an offer is
not one for credit simply because it is not the kind that would impress
most consumers. After all, the definition of "credit" itself looks to the
debtor's right to incur debt and defer its payment, and does not
145
address the terms of a particular loan.
The Kennedy and Sullivan formulations seem more consistent
with the statutory prescription for a firm offer of credit. Even so, the
confusion produced by the word "firm" in this context cannot be

140. Id.
141. The Fifth Circuit explained in Kennedy v. Chase Manhattan Bank USA,
NA, that "the Act permits a creditor to make a 'conditional' firm offer of credit; that
is an offer that is conditioned on the consumer meeting the creditor's previously-

established criteria for extending credit." 369 F.3d at 841.
142. It would be elevating form over substance to define a firm offer of credit
in this way. See Cole v. U.S. Capital, Inc., 389 F.3d 719, 727 (7th Cir. 2004). This is
where the court introduced its concept of the offer's value to the consumer. Id. at
726-27.
143. Id. at 727-28.
144. Id. at 728.

145. The term "credit" in the FCRA has the same meaning as in § 1691a of the
Equal Credit Opportunity Act. 15 U.S.C. § 168la(r)(5) (2006).
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attributed to the courts, for they must do the best with what they have.
But they need not succumb to the temptation that the Seventh Circuit
could not resist of importing requirements into the statute that the
drafters did not think belonged there. If the drafters contemplated that
a firm offer of credit would simply require an acceptance or refusal
from the consumer, they certainly would not have provided for other
contingencies in the same section, including the consideration of
"information in the consumer's application for the credit." 146 Perhaps
the problem lies with the term "firm offer," which for all intents and
purposes assures the consumer that all he has to do is to accept the
creditor's offer, which will contain all the essential elements of the
transaction. 147
The "firmness" element can be explained as giving meaning to the
offer, so that the creditor promises to honor the offer if the consumer
meets not only the pre-determined criteria that the creditor used in
selecting a consumer for the offer in the first place, but also the
creditor's other standards of creditworthiness and any collateral
requirements. 148 It may be that as a result of these other conditions a
creditor will decide not to extend credit. In that event, the consumer
will not have met the terms of the creditor's offer and the consumer
will have nothing to complain about. It is not as if the creditor offers a
guarantee to all respondents on its list. The initial screening
mechanism does its work by compiling a list of eligible consumers
who may or may not eventually qualify for an extension of credit,
depending on the circumstances of each case. The saving grace is that
the creditor must establish the specific criteria to select the consumers
for consideration before a consumer reporting agency can respond to

146. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(l). Section 1681a(1) allows the creditor to condition
the offer on the consumer's fulfillment of one or more additional criteria, one of
which is that the consumer continues to meet the criteria that the creditor used to
select the consumer in the first place. The consumer's application is simply one
place where the creditor can verify the consumer's continued eligibility. Id.
147. This is where the disagreement arises. Some consumers have tried to
promote a common law definition of the term "offer" instead of looking at the
statutory definition of "firm offer of credit." See Poehl v. Countrywide Home Loans,
Inc., 528 F.3d 1093, 1095 (8th Cir. 2008); Dixon v. Shamrock Fin. Corp., 522 F.3d
76, 79 (lstCir. 2008).
148. See NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., FAIR CREDIT REPORTING § 7.3.4.3 (6th
ed. 2006).
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the creditor's request, leaving the creditor to verify whether the
14 9
consumer continues to meet those criteria.
D. Downplaying the Role of "Value"
After Cole, it was obvious that the Seventh Circuit attached
importance to the value of a creditor's offer to the consumer. It was a
way of distinguishing between a true offer of credit and a sales
solicitation.15 0 When there is merely an offer of credit, a court does
not have to worry so much about its value to the consumer because the
basic inquiry ought to be whether the offer is firm and not whether it
is valuable to the consumer.1 51 It is understandable that in Cole the
Seventh Circuit had to ask whether the creditor's offer of credit had
value to the consumer standing alone, because the consumer had an
offer of credit that was tied to a sale of goods.1 52 It was one way of
determining whether the creditor was using the enticement of a small
loan, for example, to push the sale of merchandise that might not
ordinarily have attracted the consumer. When the Seventh Circuit took
the opportunity in Murray v. New Cingular Wireless Services 15 3 to
clarify the relevance of the value of the creditor's offer, it identified
no role for that element in the case where the offer was one for credit
only. 154 In that event, the only concern should be whether the creditor
155
has made a firm offer.

149. See 15 U.S.C. § 168la(l).
150. The court in Cole observed that "the relatively small amount of credit
combined with the known limitations of the offer-that it must be used to purchase a
vehicle-raises a question of whether the offer has value to the consumer." Cole v.
U.S. Capital, Inc., 389 F.3d 719, 728 (7th Cir. 2004).
151. See Murray v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 523 F.3d 719, 722
(7th Cir. 2008).
152. The problem in Cole was the small amount of credit which could be used
only for buying a vehicle. See Cole, 389 F.3d at 728. A similar situation arose in
Hyde v. RDA, Inc. where the offer guaranteed the consumer a minimum loan of
$300 towards the purchase of a 1999 or newer vehicle. The only problem was that
the dealer had no vehicles for sale in that price range. 389 F. Supp. 2d 658, 666-67
(D. Md. 2005). There seemed to be no value in the offer that the dealer made to the
consumer. See id.
153. Murray, 523 F.3d 719.
154. Compare Murray v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 523 F.3d at 722
(the court firmly held that the Cole directive about finding value was no longer
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The Seventh Circuit's clarification came none too soon for the
56
Eighth Circuit to concur in Poehl v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. 1
that there is no place for the "value" test when the creditor is offering
only credit. 157 After all, in Cole, the Seventh Circuit was really trying
to separate an offer of credit from a solicitation for merchandise, and
the court saw that one way of doing that was to determine the value of
the credit to the consumer.' 58 If the so-called credit was merely a
cover for peddling the merchandise, then the value component could
help a court to reach a decision on the merits of the offer. Otherwise,
there was no need to cling to the value component for a decision about
1 59
whether the creditor had made a firm offer of credit.
E. Lack of an Offer
Despite the courts' liberal interpretation of the term "firm offer of
credit," sometimes a creditor throws caution to the wind by using
loose language that provides no inkling that the creditor is making any
offer of credit. In McDonald v. NextStudent Inc., 60 the creditor merely
invited the plaintiff to contact it regarding the plaintiff's student loans.
tenable where the court is dealing with a pure offer of credit) with Murray v. GMAC
Mortgage Corp., 434 F.3d 948, 955 (7th Cir. 2006) (a point which the court merely
observed).
155. In that scenario, there is nothing else in the creditor's offer that competes
for the consumer's attention. Where an advertisement for a product is tied up with
an offer of credit, then the "value" component is much more important in deciding
on the legitimacy of the credit offer. Compare Cole v. U.S. Capital, Inc., 389 F.3d
719 (7th Cir. 2004) (finding that the small amount of credit combined with the fact
that it has to be used for buying a vehicle raised questions of whether the offer of
credit was of value to the consumer) with Murray v. New Cingular Wireless Servs.,
Inc., 523 F.3d 719 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that when the offer is one of pure credit
only, the question is whether the offer is firm, not whether it has value).
156. 528 F.3d 1093 (8th Cir. 2008).
157. Id. at 1098-99. The Poehl court also was not bothered by the lack of
material loan terms in the offer of credit, preferring instead to rely on the creditor's
preselection criteria. See id. at 1098; see also Dixon v. Shamrock Fin. Corp., 522
F.3d 76, 81 (1st Cir. 2008); Sullivan v. Greenwood Credit Union., 520 F.3d 70, 76
(1st Cir. 2008).
158. See Cole, 389 F.3d at 728.
159. See Cavin v. Home Loan Ctr., Inc., 531 F.3d 526, 531 (7th Cir. 2008);
Poehl, 528 F.3d at 1098.
160. McDonald v. NextStudent Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d 956 (E.D. Mo. 2008).
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The creditor's opt-out notice indicated that the creditor had selected
the plaintiff to receive an offer because she had met certain criteria,
but there was no indication anywhere in the notice about the nature of
the offer. 16 Although the court did not think it necessary for the
creditor to specify the amount of credit being offered, the amortization
period, or the interest rate, it nevertheless still looked for some
evidence that the creditor's invitation to the consumer constituted a
firm offer of credit and was not merely a preliminary overture to a
later offer. 162 Therefore, the creditor could not use the statute to secure
information about the consumer when a firm offer of credit was not
contemplated. Although the absence of loan terms does not
necessarily detract from the legitimacy of a creditor's offer, there must
be something in the creditor's communication that makes it effective

as an offer of credit, rather than merely a notice requesting her to
contact the creditor.
The McDonald scenario placed the creditor's letter outside the
statutory framework because a mere invitation to the consumer to
contact the creditor did not fit the bill. 163 The creditor had hoped that
its reference to how the consumer could stop receiving prescreened
offers of credit would have led the court to view the creditor's letter as
an offer in itself; if not, it would have been unnecessary to give advice

161. See id. at 957.
162. See id. at 962. The court observed that the letter was "not labeled or
presented as an offer, but as a 'Notice."' Id. The word "offer" appeared only in the
opt-out notices and the only places that the word "credit" appeared were in
notification about how to stop prescreened offers. Id.
163. The creditor's invitation read as follows: "Dear Ana, Please contact us
regarding your student loans at your earliest convenience, toll free at (800)799-7318.
This is not a late payment notice. NextStudent is not your current lender. [Hours of
Operation.] Respectfully yours, NextStudent [contact information]." Id. at 957. This
must be contrasted with the creditor's language in Sullivan v. Greenwood Credit
Union which advised the consumer: "Because of your excellent credit, you have
been preapproved for a home loan, up to 100% of the value of your home." 520 F.3d
70, 72 (1st Cir. 2008). Even though the consumer in Sullivan did not know the
specific terms of the loan for which he would eventually qualify, at least he knew
that the creditor was offering a loan, conditioned on the satisfaction of certain
criteria. See First Circuit Rules on "Firm Offer of Credit," 39 Consumer Cred. &

Truth-In-Lending Comp. Rep. 1, 2 (Earl Phillips ed.) (A.S. Pratt & Sons, May
2008).
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on that topic. 164 Furthermore, the creditor expected the consumer to
read between the lines when the consumer saw the explanation about
how the creditor happened to select her for "this offer."' 65 But there
was nothing in the creditor's introductory language that suggested an
offer, and the creditor's advice that the consumer could opt out of
receiving prescreened offers assumed that the creditor was making
such an offer in the first place. There was no room for the theory that
the creditor was merely beginning a multistep process towards the
166
eventual offer of credit.
There is little doubt that the creditor in McDonald could have
been more direct in its approach to the consumer. Instead of telling the
consumer that the communication "[was] not a late payment
notice," 167 it would have been more productive for the creditor to say
what the letter was all about. No doubt the creditor was waiting to
164. A consumer may elect to have his name removed from any list
maintained by a consumer reporting agency in connection with prescreened offers.
15 U.S.C. § 1681b(e) (2006).
165. The consumer was none the wiser about what the creditor had in mind.
The consumer had to guess that there was some connection between the contact that
the creditor requested and the offer referred to on the back of the creditor's letter.
See McDonald, 542 F. Supp. 2d at 957.
166. The legislative history of § 1681b(c)(1)(B)(i) gives some idea of the
rationale for requiring a creditor to make a firm offer of credit. The Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs issued a report on the bill,
Consumer Reporting Reform Act of 1994, that explained the prescreening
mechanism as follows:
The Committee seeks to balance any privacy concerns created by
prescreening with the benefit of a firm offer of credit or insurance for all
consumers identified through the screening process. While the direct
marketing portion of section 103 prevents consumer reporting agencies
from providing lists that are based on credit limit, credit payment history,
credit balance, or negative information, the Committee understands that
such factors must be considered in order to market credit or insurance. For
this reason, the prescreening section of the Committee bill allows credit
and insurance providers to obtain lists for credit and insurance transactions
not initiated by the consumer based on this more sensitive information. In
exchange for allowing credit and insurance providers to obtain lists on
more sensitive information, however, the bill requires that the credit or
insurance provider make a "firm offer," as defined in section 101 of the
Committee bill, of credit or insurance to all consumers on the list.
S. REP. No. 103-209, at 13-14 (1993).
167. McDonald, 542 F. Supp. 2d at 957.
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share the good news once the consumer responded to the creditor's
initial overture.1 68 But the basis on which a creditor secures a
consumer's contact information from a reporting agency is that the
consumer meets certain criteria. The firm offer of credit should then
result from that prescreening process and not left to subsequent
inquiries. Absent a firm offer of credit, a creditor enjoys the luxury of
soliciting the consumer for other matters having nothing to do with
credit, and that is precisely what the FCRA was designed to avoid.
A creditor does not have to delve into the terms of a particular
loan in order for it to make a firm offer of credit, and courts will bend
over backwards to make that point.' 69 It is understood that the
statutory definition of a firm offer leaves room for a subsequent
negotiation between the parties about specific terms. 170 Therefore, a
creditor's offer of credit may not necessarily be immediately subject
to acceptance if the consumer does not meet the conditions that are
statutorily permissible. Nevertheless, the statutory flexibility
sometimes raises questions about the creditor's language, even when
that language is not as weak as in McDonald.
In Dixon v. Shamrock Financial Corp.,17 1 the creditor prevailed
against the consumer's claim that there was no firm offer of credit, but
it is questionable whether the creditor's invitation to the consumer to
have "a free consultation" and the assurance that the creditor's letter
was "not a commitment to make a loan" led in the direction of a firm

168. The defendant contemplated "a multi-step process whereby the offer of
credit is later extended to the consumer orally." Id. at 963. By then the creditor
would have had access to the information that allows it to prescreen in the first
place, thus defeating the purpose of the legislation. See FAIR CREDIT REPORTING,
supra note 35, § 7.3.4.3.
169. See Cavin v. Home Loan Ctr., Inc., 531 F.3d 526, 529 (7th Cir. 2008)
(stating that terms of loan need not be explained in initial offer letter); Poehl v.
Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 528 F.3d 1093, 1098, (8th Cir. 2008) (finding firm
offer of credit even though information contained only general range of loan
amounts available); Sullivan v. Greenwood Credit Union, 520 F.3d 70, 76 (1 st Cir.

2008) (finding no statutory requirement for inclusion of specific loan terms).
170. See Sullivan, 520 F.3d at 76 (recognizing that a firm offer may be
conditioned on the consumer's meeting certain criteria); Kennedy v. Chase
Manhattan Bank USA NA, 369 F.3d 833, 841-42 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that
creditor had made a firm offer of credit even though consumer could not meet
criteria).
171. Dixon v. Shamrock Fin. Corp., 522 F.3d 76 (Ist Cir. 2008).
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offer of credit.1 72 This was not an offer in the common law sense, but
one statutorily prescribed, and the Dixon court did not look for the
usual trappings which would make the offer immediately acceptable
to the consumer. 173 Nevertheless, the deference to a creditor's loose
language does not sit well in this context if the statutory definition still
requires that there be an offer, even if it is subject to all the demands
of the consumer's eventual qualifications. Surely a statement that the
creditor can pay off the consumer's debt and refinance the consumer's
mortgage is on the fringe of an offer, which although better than the
McDonald attempt, still does not represent the kind of invitation that
one would expect from a prescreening lender. Even if it is not
necessary to include all of a loan's material terms, a creditor should
still have to make an offer of credit and not refer merely to a free
174
consultation to start the ball rolling.
V. THE DEMANDS OF EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTUNITY

A. Explaining the Denial
If a lender denies credit to a consumer, it must give the consumer
specific written reasons for its denial. 175 This requirement is consistent
with the legislative objective of ensuring that a lender does not
discriminate in its lending practices, and gives a rejected consumer an
opportunity to address any deficiencies or to correct any mistakes in

172. See id. at 78.
173. See id. at 79-80; see also Poehl, 528 F.3d at 1097 (finding that "the
statutory definition of 'firm offer of credit' precludes reliance on common law
definitions."); Sullivan, 520 F.3d at 75 (stating that the general rule that a common
law term in a statute comes with a common law meaning does not apply because the
term "firm offer of credit" is defined explicitly in the FCRA). The United States
Supreme Court recently reinforced the common law approach in finding that the
phrase "willfully fails to comply" in § 1681n(a) reaches reckless FCRA violations,
following the general rule that "a common law term in a statute comes with a
common law meaning, absent anything pointing another way." Safeco Ins. Co. of
Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 57-58 (2007); see also 1 JOHN E. MURRAY, JR. &
TIMOTHY MURRAY, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, § 1.11 (rev'd ed. Fall Cum. Supp.

2008).
174. In Dixon, the invitation for a "free consultation" was accompanied by the
creditor's reminder that it was not committing to make a loan. 522 F.3d at 78.
175. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(d); 12 C.F.R. § 202.9(a)(2).
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his credit file.17 6 Although the Federal Reserve Board has published
several sample forms to guide lenders in giving reasons for the denial
of credit, 177 lenders are not duty bound to use those forms, and a
lender's decision to craft its own rejection notice has often led to
questions about the sufficiency of the lender's notice to the
consumer. 178 When a lender clearly conveys the reason for its adverse
action by identifying one or more of the grounds identified in the
sample notice, it satisfies the requirement of giving a statement of the
specific reasons for the action taken. 179 Nevertheless, the sample form
does not meet every contingency, and sometimes a lender will have to
improvise in order to address a particular situation. 180 In that event, a
lender should modify the 18checklist by substituting or adding other
reasons for denying credit. 1
Occasionally a lender will run into difficulty by using language
that comes close to that suggested in the sample form, while still
leaving the consumer in a quandary about the rationale for its
decision. In Fischl v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.,182 the lender
could not have come any closer to the mark when it used the phrase
176. See Treadway v. Gateway Chevrolet Oldsmobile, Inc., 362 F.3d 971, 977
(7th Cir. 2004); Padin v. Oyster Point Dodge, 397 F. Supp. 2d 712, 717 (E.D. Va.
2005). The legislative history of the ECOA gives some idea of the requirement for a
creditor to give reasons for its adverse action:
The requirement that creditors give reasons for adverse action is, in the
view, a strong and necessary adjunct to the
Committee's
antidiscrimination purpose of the legislation, for only if creditors know
they must explain their decisions will they effectively be discouraged from
discriminatory practices. Yet this requirement fulfills a broader need:
rejected credit applicants will now be able to learn where and how their
credit status is deficient and this information should have a pervasive and
valuable educational benefit.
S. REP. No. 94-589, at 4 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 403, 406.
177. See 12 C.F.R. pt. 202 app. C (2009).
178. Appendix C to Regulation B provides that "[a] creditor may design its
own notification forms or use all or a portion of the forms contained in [the]
appendix." 12 C.F.R. pt. 202 app. C-5 (2009).
179. See 15 U.S.C. § 1691(d)(3); 12 C.F.R. § 202.9(a)(2)(i).
180. The Federal Reserve Board, the agency responsible for issuing
Regulation B, advises that "[t]he sample forms are illustrative and may not be
appropriate for all creditors." 12 C.F.R. pt. 202 app. C-3 (2009).
181. Id.
182. Fischl v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 708 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1983).
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"credit references are insufficient" in conveying its reason for
rejecting the consumer's application.' 83 The phrase that would have
kept it out of trouble was "insufficient credit references," for the
Board's sample form had used that language in its approved list of
reasons.184 It is left to conjecture whether the lender regarded the two
phrases as synonymous, but the court in Fischl was keen enough to
observe that the Board's statement conveyed a "quantitative
inadequacy" in the consumer's credit status, while the lender's phrase
implied some "qualitative deficiency."' 85 Even if the lender was
persuaded by the similarity in terms that its message was precise
enough to comply with the statutory mandate, one might still query
the wisdom of the lender's decision to run the risk of creating even a
slight ambiguity in its rejection notice. After all, Congress viewed the
notice requirement as an essential feature of the overall statutory
scheme to advise the consumer of the specific reasons behind a denial
of credit and to discourage lenders from engaging in discriminatory
practices.186 The lender in Fischl left the consumer pondering how he
could satisfy the lender's requirements for credit when confronted
only with the "insufficiency" language. A lender surely has an
obligation to give some clue about the nature of the deficiency, if not
it would be able to seek refuge in the vagueness of the language
conveying the bad news, while also not giving any guidance about the
prospects for rehabilitating the consumer's record.
One can understand a lender's dependence on the similarity of the
regulatory language, but perhaps the Board should bear some
responsibility for a lender's dilemma. The phrase "insufficient credit
references" does not rank much higher than "credit references are
insufficient" in terms of precision and clarity, for the consumer is still

183. Id. at 145.
184. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.9(b)(2) (1983).
185. Fischl, 708 F.2d at 147.
186. See Williams v. MBNA Am. Bank, N.A., 538 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 10181019 (E.D. Mich. 2008); Diaz v. Paragon Motors of Woodside, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 2d
519, 532 n.22 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); S. REP. No. 84-589, at 4 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 403, 406; Stephen M. Dane, Eliminating the Labyrinth: A Proposalto
Simplify Federal Mortgage Discrimination Laws, 26 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 527,
547-48 (1993).
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187
left to wonder about the real reason for the lender's disapproval.
The lender must have thought that it was improving the Board's
handiwork, but if anything, the lender created more doubt in the
consumer's mind about the denial of credit. The consumer could have

interpreted the language to mean that the lender was dissatisfied with
the quality of the references offered, or he might have wondered
whether the addition of one or two more references would have saved
his application. 88 A consumer should not be left to drift in a sea of
uncertainty about the reasons for a lender's decision, but this does not
mean that the lender must use the exact language suggested by the
Board. If a lender wants to be original, it must at least convey a
message that helps the consumer appreciate the soundness of its
decision.
There is little doubt that in many cases a lender can alter or
improve the Board's suggested language because that language may
not always give an adequate statement of the reasons for the creditor's
adverse decision. 189 It is comforting that the Board recognized the
ambiguity of the previous "insufficiency" language by identifying one
of the current possibilities for adverse action as "[i]nsufficient number
of credit references provided."' 190 That language underscores the
quantitative nature of the creditor's assessment, a feature that was less
than obvious from the Board's former phrase. 191 It may simply be a
187. The ECOA's legislative history shows that Congress was concerned
about the specific reasons for a creditor's adverse action. The Conference Report on
the bill to amend the Consumer Credit Protection Act made the point that the Report
was modifying the Senate language to require that the creditor give "'the specific
reasons for the adverse action taken."' H.R. REP. No. 94-873, at 8 (1976) (Conf.
Rep.), reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 403,428.
188. The language simply raised questions about the "sufficiency" bar. A
consumer would not know how he could satisfy the creditor's requirements, and that
was, after all, part of the rationale for specific reasons. See Treadway v. Gateway
Chevrolet Oldsmobile, Inc., 362 F.3d 971, 977 (7th Cir. 2004), Jochum v. Pico
Credit Corp. of Westbank, Inc., 730 F.2d 1041, 1043 (5th Cir. 1984).
189. The appendix to Regulation B recognizes that "[i]f a creditor chooses to
use the checklist of reasons provided in one of the sample forms in this appendix
and if reasons commonly used by the creditor are not provided on the form, the
creditor should modify the checklist by substituting or adding other reasons." 12
C.F.R. pt. 202 app. C-3 (2009).
190. Id.atFormC-1.
191. The court in Fischl v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. observed that
the phrase "insufficient credit references" connoted "quantitative inadequacy." 708
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clarification of what the Board had in mind in the first place, but it
also puts in perspective the Fischl court's appeal for clarity in the
notification scheme. 192 That appeal may not have fallen on deaf ears,
for the replacement phrase conveys the message that the creditor is
looking for a certain number of references, 193 even though a consumer
will be none the wiser about the magical number required. It is left
then to the consumer to explore the requirements with the creditor if
he wants more details, once he knows about the quantitative element.
Suffice it to say that the introduction of this numerical aspect
facilitates the creditor's message to the consumer that there is a
deficiency that he can understand and remedy.
There are other examples of a creditor's ambiguous use of
language in rejecting a consumer's application. In Higgins v. J.C.
Penney, Inc., 19 4 the lender rejected the consumer's application on the
basis of the "type of bank accounts" and the "type of credit
references." 195 How was the consumer to know that a savings account
would not give her as high a rating as a checking account, or that her
credit score was harmed by the lack of a major bank card?
Nevertheless, the court saw nothing wrong with the lender's reasons,
since they were specific enough in the court's view to resemble some
of those already listed in the regulation. 196 The Board reflects this
thinking in its comment, where it states "[a] creditor need not describe
how or why a factor adversely affected an applicant." 197 A lender is

F.2d 143, 147 (5th Cir. 1983). It went on, however, to discuss the concern of
consumers and of governmental agencies alike with the vagueness of the language.
See id. at 148 (citing Winnie Taylor, Meeting the Equal Opportunity Act's
Specificity Requirement: Judgmental and Statistical Scoring Systems, 29 BUFFALO

L. REv. 73, 90 (1980)).
192. The operative phase in Fischl was "credit references are insufficient."
708 F.2d at 145. The consumer was still left wondering what was sufficient in the
creditor's view. The court stated that "the reason articulated was misleading, or at
best excessively vague." Id. at 148.
193. See 12 C.F.R. pt. 202 app. C (Form C-I).

194. Higgins v. J.C. Penney, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 722 (E.D. Mo. 1986).
195. Id. at 723.
196. Id. at 725.
197. Official Staff Commentary, 12 C.F.R. pt. 202 supp. 1, cmt. 9(b)(2)-3
(2009). The Federal Reserve Board issued an Official Staff Commentary on
Regulation B that protects a creditor from liability for "any act done or omitted in

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol46/iss1/2

38

Griffith: Credit Reporting, Prescreened Lists, and Adverse Action: The Impa

2009]

CREDIT REPORTING, PRESCREENED LISTS

& ADVERSE ACTION

39

protected if it gives the reason for denial as "length of residence"
rather than "too short a period of residence."' 98 In Higgins, the court
admitted that the lender's response required "some degree of
deductive reasoning,"' 199 but found no fault with the language, no
doubt relying on the "residence" example given by the Board.200 In
either case, the reasons the lender gave did not get to the heart of the
matter, and the consumer was left to fend for himself after only being
given some general idea of the category that worried the lender.
If the regulatory mandate requires a lender to give specific
reasons, a consumer should not be left to wonder which type of
account was the cause of the rejection. It is fair to say that a consumer
may wonder whether the lender was sending a message to stay away
from certain types of accounts, or whether it was stipulating that a
consumer must have a certain type of account for the lender to look
favorably on his application. In Higgins, the consumer had only a
savings account, but the "type of account" language did not give the
consumer any confidence about the types that the lender would find
acceptable. 2 ' It is hard to support this degree of generality on the
basis of administrative convenience, for the consumer is in no better
position to determine the deficiency in his credit application.
Furthermore, this approach gives a lender an advantage by allowing it
to couch its decision in a way that may make it easier for the lender to
hide its discriminatory practices. 2 There may always be a debate
about how far a lender should go when informing a consumer about its
precise reasons for denying credit. At a minimum, however, a lender

good faith in conformity with an interpretation issued by a duly authorized official
of the Federal Reserve Board. 12 C.F.R. pt. 202 supp. I (Introduction).
198. Official Staff Commentary, 12 C.F.R. pt. 202 supp. 1, cmt. 9(b)(2)-3.
199. Higgins, 630 F. Supp. at 725.
200. See id.
201. The Higgins court acknowledged that "[t]he second and third reasons
given by [the creditor], 'type of bank accounts' and 'type of credit references,'
[were] less obviously sufficient." Id. at 724. The court was comparing the message
gleaned from those phrases with that flowing from the language for the first reason,
"'credit bureau report/ delinquent history."' Id. One can understand why the court
was less confident about the "bank account" language.
202. If creditors know that they must explain their decisions, they may be
deterred from unlawful discrimination. See S. REP. No. 94-589, at 4 (1976),
reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 403,406.
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should be expected to give some clue about the key elements affecting
the lender's adverse decision.
It is true that a lender does not have to use the exact language
contained in the model form, but when a lender uses its own version to
convey the bad news about its loan denial, a consumer should expect
even more precision and clarity. 20 3 It is pointless for a lender to come
up with some general category that leaves the consumer ignorant
about the rationale for its decision. Take, for instance, a notice that
lists "excessive credit obligations" and "credit file" as the reasons for
the lender's adverse action. 20 4 It would only be natural for a consumer
to ask why a lender would opt for "excessive credit obligations" as the
proper formulation when the model form suggests a possible
alternative such as "excessive obligations in relation to income."205
There is a difference between the two phrases. In one case, a lender
may be simply sending a message that the consumer is overextended
with respect to his credit obligations, while the latter phrase takes into
account all the consumer's obligations in relation to his income. A
lender would be legitimately concerned about the amount of credit
that a consumer has assumed, and therefore the lender's reference to
the consumer's excesses in this regard seems specific enough to meet
the regulatory requirements. At least the consumer is put on notice
that he has taken on more than he can handle, and that there are
problems with his credit record that merit his attention.
The lender in Aikens v. Northwestern Dodge, Inc., 206 deviated
from the model language because it wanted to emphasize the
unhealthy ratio of the consumer's credit obligations to the creditor's
203. The Official Staff Commentary states that a creditor's adverse action
notice may say "length of residence" instead of "too short a period of residence." 12
C.F.R. pt. 202 supp. 1, cmt. 9(b)(2)-3. It is questionable whether this is a good
example of the rationale for not requiring a creditor to give details about how a
factor adversely affected an application. Surely when the consumer finds out that the
reason for the creditor's rejection of his application relates to his length of residence,
he will not pause for any period of time to wonder whether he has lived too long in
one place to qualify for a loan. Therefore, it should not be necessary for a creditor to
expand on the phrase "length of residence" in this context. But that is a little
different, for example, from referring to "types of bank accounts."
204. See Aikens v. Nw. Dodge, Inc., No. 03 C 7956, 2006 WL 59408, at *1
(N.D. Il.Jan. 5, 2006)

205. 12 C.F.R. pt. 202 app. C (Form C-1) (2009).
206. Aikens, 2006 WL 59408.
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income. 20 7 It was necessary, therefore, for the lender to include the
term "credit" in the reasons given for its adverse decision, but it was
certainly not necessary to include a reference to "income" when it was
already sending a message about the consumer's credit obligations.
The consumer already knew that the amount of credit available would
be related to his income, and that the lender would make its decision
20 8
about credit in the context of the consumer's resources.
A consumer will always wonder how many obligations are too
many, but a lender need not get into that kind of detail in trying to
give the consumer the specific reasons for denial. 20 9 It is left to the
consumer to pursue matters further if he wants to rehabilitate his
record. The lender's response to the consumer's application will
certainly put the consumer on the right track to resolving his credit
problems, but it is not intended to give a full explanation of how he
210
can accomplish that.
On the other hand, one might query a lender's use of the term
"credit file" as a reason for a denial of credit. 211 It is one thing to hinge
a refusal on the absence of a credit file in the consumer's name, but
quite another just to mention "credit file" without any explanation.
207. See id. at *4. The court made the following observation: "The phrase

'excessive credit obligations' confirms what Plaintiff already knew to be true about
her credit status: i.e., that she had 'several' outstanding credit obligations, including
a federal tax lien." Id. The message was certainly that the consumer did not have
enough income to meet her credit obligations.
208. The lender's notice "adequately advised Plaintiff that she had too
many ... credit obligations to qualify for additional credit from [lender], which is all
the ECOA requires." Id.
209. The ECOA's legislative history gives some idea of how a creditor may
comply with a "statement of reasons" requirement:

The Committee does not expect or intend that statements of reasons be
given in the form of long, detailed personal letters. The bill calls for a
"concise indication" of the applicant's deficiencies, and a short check-list
statement will be sufficient so long as it reasonably indicates the grounds
for adverse action.
S. REP. No. 94-589, at 8 (1976), reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 403, 410; see also
Anderson v. Capital One Bank, 224 F.R.D. 444, 447 (W.D. Wis. 2004).
210. The Official Staff Commentary indicates that "[a] creditor need not
describe how or why a factor adversely affected an applicant." 12 C.F.R. pt 202
supp.1, cmt. 9(b)(2)-3 (2009); see also NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., CREDIT
DISCRIMINATION § 10.5.4.2.2 (5th ed. 2009) [hereinafter CREDIT DISCRIMINATION].
211. See Aikens, 2006 WL 59408, at *4.
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Maybe the Aikens court was trying to come close to the model
language "no credit file," but at least that language conveys the
message that the consumer had no credit history on which a lender
could base its decision. This attempt at brevity simply underscores the
challenge that lenders face in being succinct in their rejection notices
without compromising quality and precision. Some lenders strive to
give the consumer as little information as possible, hoping that the
consumer will draw his own inferences. Nowhere was this more
evident than in Aikens, where the reference to "credit file" was short
and imprecise. 212 Perhaps lenders have been led astray by
congressional assurance that they do not have to give long, personal
statements of reasons for their decisions, and that it is sufficient
instead to provide a short checklist that reasonably explains such
reasons.

2 13

The challenge lies in meeting the "reasonable explanation"
criterion.21a In some ways, the search for such reasonableness does not
become any easier when a lender knows that it can opt for the
checklist approach.215 A lender's use of that mechanism tends to
trivialize matters instead of encouraging a lender to reveal the true
rationale for its rejection. It is not clear why a creditor would want to
settle for a brief phrase taken from a checklist when that phrase leaves
doubts in the consumer's mind about the reasons for the creditor's
decision. The most that can be said about the phrase "credit file" is
that it is a respectable generality that leaves a slight clue that the
lender based its decision on something in the consumer's file. It is true
that in Aikens the reference to "excessive credit obligations"
212. The lender advised the consumer that it based its denial of credit on the
consumer's "excessive credit obligations and credit file." Id. at *3.
213. See S. REP. No. 94-589, at 8.
214. Compare O'Dowd v. S. Cent. Bell, 729 F.2d 347, 352 (5th Cir. 1984)
(finding that company's threat to cut off consumer's telephone service due to past
payment record of deposit not made by certain date provides specific reason for
adverse action), with Fischl v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. 708 F.2d 143, 147
(5th Cir. 1983) (finding the language "credit references are insufficient" misleading
and vague, and therefore not fulfilling the requirement for a specific reason for
adverse action).
215. The Board explains, however, that "[i]f the reasons listed on the [sample]
forms are not the factors actually used, a creditor will not satisfy the notice
requirement by simply checking the closest identifiable factor listed." 12 C.F.R. pt.
202 app. C-3 (2008).
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overshadowed the reference to "credit file" and so no damage was
done, but the court may have left the impression that the "credit file"
designation could stand on its own merits in fulfillment of the specific
reasons for the lender's denial.216 It would have been misleading for
the lender to say "no credit file," but merely dropping the "no" did not
say much about the consumer's situation. 21 7 Nevertheless, even with
that modification, there was still room for improvement. The simple
reference to "credit file" really does not identify the problem with the
applicant's file, and the notice to the applicant does not achieve the
desired specificity stipulated in the regulation. On the other hand, if
the applicant does not have a credit file at all, a creditor may be
reluctant to extend credit because there is nothing there on which a
creditor can base its decision.
B. The Problem of Vagueness
It is understandable that a creditor should not have to give its
statement of reasons to an applicant in a detailed personal letter, 21 8 but
a creditor should not go to the other extreme in making a general
reference to an applicant's file that does not leave a single clue about
the deficiency in the applicant's record. This is not to say that an
applicant must find the creditor's notice "educational" or "helpful" for
the notice to pass muster, 219 but the notion that the notice need only
meet the test of general transparency runs counter to the proposition
that the creditor must identify the specific reasons for its adverse
decision. 220 A creditor compromises specificity when its statement of
216. It is not clear that the consumer's challenge of the phrase "credit file" was
based on the consumer's interest in having the creditor use the sample form
language, "no credit file." That would have been misleading, because the consumer
did have a credit file. See Aikens, 2006 WL 59408, at *4. But the creditor's
modification of the sample language made the message vague and meaningless. This
part of the notice provided a good example of imprecise language.
217. Id.
218. See Anderson v. Capital One Bank, 224 F.R.D 444, 447 (W.D. Wis.
2004); O'Dowd, 729 F.2d at 352; S. REP. No. 94-589, at 8 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 403,410.
219. See Aikens, 2006 WL 59408, at *5.
220. The court in Pettineo v. Harleysville NationalBank & Trust Co. approved
this "general transparency" approach. No.Civ.A 05-4138, 2006 WL 241243, at *3
(E.D. Pa. Jan. 31, 2006). One wonders whether the court went to the other extreme
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reasons includes not only grounds that apply to an applicant, but
others that do not. 22' Allowing a creditor this leeway avoids the
legislative purpose of requiring a creditor to explain its decision, for
the obligation to do so discourages a creditor from engaging in
discriminatory practices. 222 It is indeed a reasonable objective to save
creditors from long, detailed statements, but certainly not at the
expense of clarity and precision. Furthermore, there is no excuse for a
creditor to confuse an applicant with grounds that are not relevant to
his situation.
In many cases it is a question of how vague a creditor can be in
giving its reasons for declining credit. In Stoyanovich v. Fine Art
Capital,223 the creditor based its decision on "credit-related
information obtained from sources other than consumer reporting
' 24 The creditor did not give the applicant any specific
agencies. ",22
reason for the denial, and the court found that the creditor did not meet
the statutory mandate.225 The only information the applicant gleaned
from the creditor's message was that "a consumer reporting agency
was not the source of the 'credit-related information' that [the
creditor] relied upon" for its decision.226 There was no way that the
applicant could rely on the creditor's statement in order to ascertain
the weaknesses in his record and take the necessary remedial measures

in trying to avoid the requirement of a creditor's detailed statement. See
DISCRIMINATION,

CREDIT

supra note 210, § 10.5.4.2.1.

221. If a creditor uses the Board's sample form, it should adapt the form to
meet the demands of a particular case. A creditor cannot escape liability by merely
checking off factors that are not relevant to the denial. See 12 C.F.R. pt. 202 app. C-

3 (2009).
222. See S. REP. No. 94-589, at 8. It is to be noted, however, that the adverse
notice requirements apply to all applicants, and not only to applicants alleging
discrimination. See Williams v. MBNA Am. Bank, N.A., 538 F. Supp. 2d 1015,
1019 (E.D. Mich. 2008); Diaz v. Paragon Motors of Woodside, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 2d
519, 532 n.22 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); Costa v. Mauro Chevrolet, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 2d
720, 728 (N.D. I11.
2005).
223. Stoyanovich v. Fine Art Capital L.L.C., No. 06 Civ. 13158, 2007 WL
2363656 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2007).
224. Id. at *6.
225. Id.
226. Id.
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to improve it.227 The creditor narrowed the sources of information for
the applicant's benefit, but in the final analysis, the applicant still did
not know why the creditor had denied him credit.
A creditor also fails the statutory test if it merely lists only one
factor, when in fact relying on several in reaching its decision. 228 The
creditor's objective should be to give the applicant a complete picture
of the situation, covering not only the creditor's perspective, but also
the grounds upon which that perspective is based. If the creditor omits
any of the reasons underlying its decision, the consumer will hardly be
able to correct any deficiencies in his record, and the creditor will be
at liberty to avoid telling the whole story. While it is true that a
creditor does not have to write an essay detailing the reasons for
refusing credit to the consumer, at least one court has gone to the other
extreme of requiring only transparency in the notice of adverse
action. 229 The court in Pettineo v. Harleysville National Bank and
Trust Company230 was satisfied that the ECOA and Regulation B did
not require that "the [notification letter] be narrowly tailored to fit the
specific instance of a denied applicant.", 23' The creditor's rejection
letter indicated one basis for the creditor's action as "[g]arnishment,
attachment, foreclosure, repossession, collection action or
judgment. ' 232 The only problem was that the plaintiff was never
involved in a garnishment, attachment, foreclosure, repossession, or
judgment.233 Among all the possibilities mentioned, only one ground
was relevant to the consumer's situation.

227. See id. The consumer in Fischl v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 708
F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1983), had a similar experience with the phrase "credit references
are insufficient." Fischl, 708 F.2d at 145. In both Stoyanovich and Fischl, the
consumer was left in a quandary about the real state of affairs.

228. Regulation B requires that "[tihe statement of reasons for adverse
action ... must be specific and indicate the principal reason(s) for the adverse
action." 12 C.F.R. § 202.9(b)(2) (2008). The Official Staff Commentary notes,
however, that disclosing more than four reasons is not likely to help the applicant.
12 C.F.R. pt. 202 supp. 1, cmt. 9(b)(2) (2009).
229. See Pettineo v. Harleysville Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., No. Civ.A. 05-4138,
2006 WL 241243, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Jan 31, 2006).
230. 2006 WL 241243.
231. Id.at*3.
232. Id. at *1.

233. Id.
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The court was too lenient in allowing the lender to list the
possibilities for the lender's rejection; it was not bothered by the
lender's lack of focus on the consumer's application.2 34 It is not asking
too much for a lender to "describe the factors actually considered or
scored by a creditor." 235 If the lender presents a list of real and unreal
reasons, it leaves the consumer in a quandary about the real state of
affairs and defeats the purpose of the notice requirement. This notion
of general transparency does not allow a lender free rein to muddy the
waters with information that is not relevant to the particular
applicant. 236 If the lender wants to use a checklist approach with
several possibilities, that is one thing, for then the lender can merely
check off those that apply to the application under consideration. But
it is quite another to place all the possibilities in narrative form,
merely hoping that the disjunctive "or" will solve the problem of
ambiguity and confusion.
Despite its best efforts, a creditor will sometimes fall short of a
consumer's expectations. In Williams v. MBNA America Bank,237 the
consumer was not satisfied when the creditor informed her that she
had "sufficient balances on [her] revolving line of credit," and that she
had "sufficient credit available considering [her] income., 238 The
consumer was a student with no income of her own, and the creditor
was legitimately concerned about her ability to assume new debt. The
creditor's reasons for denying the consumer's application seemed
legitimate enough, but the consumer thought them to be "incoherent"
and "illogical., 239 The applicant must have been frustrated by the
creditor's negative message, for she viewed it as falling short of the
240
standard of clarity and conspicuousness required by the regulation.
The only problem was that Regulation B's reference to clarity and
conspicuousness relates to the format of disclosures, and not to the

234.
235.
(2009).
236.
237.
2008).
238.
239.
240.

Id. at *3
Official Staff Commentary, 12 C.F.R. pt. 202 supp. 1,cmt. 9(b)(2)-2
See CREDIT DISCRIMINATION, supra note 210, § 10.5.4.2.2.
Williams v. MBNA Am. Bank, N.A., 538 F. Supp. 2d 1015 (E.D. Mich.
Id. at 1017.
Id. at 1020.
See id. at 1021.
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notice of a creditor's adverse action. 24 1 There was no evidence in
Williams that the creditor had obscured any required information
relating to the creditor's reason for declining the credit application. 42
The applicant's plea for a readily understandable explanation of the
reasons behind the creditor's decision did not carry much weight
because there was no ambiguity and no hidden message in the
creditor's language. 243 Unlike the situation in Fischl v. General
Motors Acceptance Corp.,244 where the creditor missed the mark with
its message that the applicant's credit references were insufficient,
241. Regulation B provides as follows with respect to the form of disclaimers:
"A creditor that provides in writing any disclosures or information required by the
regulation must provide the disclosures in a clear and conspicuous manner and,
except for the disclosures required by §§ 202.5 and 202.13, in a form the applicant
may retain." 12 C.F.R. § 202.4 (d) (2009). The Official Staff Commentary supports
the idea that clarity and conspicuousness relate to the form of disclosures, rather
than the content of the notice about any adverse action. It requires a creditor to make
disclosures "in a reasonably understandable format that does not obscure the
required information." The disclosures must be "legible, whether type-written,
handwritten, or printed by computer." 12 C.F.R. pt. 202 supp.1, cmt. 4(d)-l (2009).
242. The creditor's letter gave the reasons for rejection in the following
language: "After careful review, we are unable to approve your request because you
have sufficient balances on your revolving credit lines and you have sufficient credit
available considering your income. Our credit decision was based in whole or in part
on information obtained in a report from Experian .... ." Williams, 538 F. Supp. 2d
at 1017.
243. The Official Staff Commentary ties a creditor's disclosures to a
"reasonably understandable format." 12 C.F.R. pt. 202 supp.1, cmt. 4(d)-l. In this
respect Regulation B is similar to Regulation M (consumer leasing), which requires
a creditor to make disclosures "clearly and conspicuously." 12 C.F.R. § 213.3(a)
(2009). This does not mean that the disclosures are unclear unless the average
consumer can understand them. For example, in Jordan v. Toyota Motor Credit
Corp., the Seventh Circuit held that a lessor's reference to the "constant-yield
method" of calculating an early termination charge in a lease passed the clarity test.
236 F.3d 866, 868 (7th Cir. 2001); see also Applebaum v. Nissan Motor Acceptance
Corp., 226 F.3d 214, 220 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that lease's reference to "constantyield method" satisfies Regulation M even if the average consumer does not
understand the term). Nevertheless, when the Federal Trade Commission was
agitating in its 2005 annual report for an amendment to the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act that would add clarity to section 809(a), it suggested that "clear and
conspicuous" should be defined as "'readily noticeable, readable, and
comprehensible to the ordinary consumer."' 2006 FTC ANNUAL REP.: FAIR DEBT
COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 14.

244. Fischl v. GMAC, 708 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1983).
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there was no doubt here about the specific reason for the creditor's
action. The applicant might have thought that he needed more
references or that he had to improve his quality if he hoped to be
successful the next time around. In Williams, however, the message
was clear; the applicant already had sufficient credit and more of it
245
would only get her into trouble.
Sometimes a consumer may be unhappy about a creditor's stated
reasons for the adverse action taken because he believes that they are
not true. In Para v. United Carolina Bank,24 6 the consumer alleged
that the creditor denied her application because she was an unmarried
female, 247 but the notice of denial indicated that she lacked an
established earnings record and had inadequate capital.248 There could
hardly be any argument here about specificity, and the court did not
see any violation on that ground when the creditor gave its reasons for
denying the consumer's application. 249 There was no allegation in
Para that the creditor had listed only one or two factors from among
several that might have contributed to the decision. 250 The consumer
was actually asserting a claim of discrimination, and the court treated
any disagreement about the true reasons for the denial as relating to
that claim, rather than to the adequacy of the denial notice. 251 It meant,
therefore, that even if the creditor had hidden its discrimination with
plausible phraseology, it was on safe ground because "discriminatory
animus is clearly not a specific reason a lender might be expected to
include an ECOA notice. ,252
It is open to question, however, whether a creditor's statement of
reasons for denial should be deemed adequate if they are not true
because the creditor's motivation was to discriminate against the
245. See Williams, 538 F. Supp. 2d at 1020.
246. Para v. United Carolina Bank, No. 7:97-CV-54-BR(I), 1998 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 16843 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 26, 1998).
247. Id. at *9.
248. Id. at *8.
249. Id. at *10.
250. The Para case was not like Caroll v. Exxon Co., U.SA. where the
defendant failed to meet statutory requirements by listing only one of at least five
factors when it denied the consumer's application for credit. See Carroll v. Exxon
Co., U.S.A., 434 F. Supp. 557, 562 (E.D. La. 1977).
251. See Para, 1998 U.S. Dist. Lexis 16843, at "21-*22.
252. Id. at *9.
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consumer. In Fischl, the creditor did not escape liability with its
perfunctory reliance on the phrase "credit references are insufficient,"
when the real reasons for the adverse action were related to the
253
consumer's brief credit history and the large amount of the loan.
There was little doubt that the creditor had other reasons for denying
credit other than those stated in the notice of adverse action. 254 But if
the creditor's notice must be regarded as unacceptable under these
circumstances because the creditor could just as easily give the real
reasons for its action, then the creditor ought not to be able to avoid
liability simply because the real reason would bear some stigma on
account of its discriminatory component. 25 5 It is true that a creditor
would not be expected to reveal its discriminatory intent in assessing
credit applications, but on the other hand, there is no good reason for
giving a creditor an advantage when the real reason for rejecting the
consumer will put the creditor in a bad light.256 The statute should
provide an incentive for the creditor to do the right thing, and the
notice provision is not a mechanism that is intended to accommodate
the creditor's unlawful conduct.
VI. NOTICE OF ADVERSE ACTION

A. The Nature of the Obligation
A creditor is the one who must take adverse action for it to have
an obligation to give notice to the consumer.2 5 7 When a lender makes
a negative decision about a consumer's application, there is usually no
253. The court in Fischl recognized that "[g]iven that a combination of factors
contributed to GMAC's adverse credit determination, the reason articulated was
misleading, or at best excessively vague." 708 F.2d 143, 148 (5th Cir. 1983).
254. The Fischlcourt believed that the term "credit references are insufficient"
gave some indication of a qualitative deficiency in the consumer's credit standing.
See id. at 147. The real reasons for rejection were the consumer's brief credit history
and the excessive loan amount involved in the transaction.

255. See CREDIT DISCRIMINATION, supra note 210, § 10.5.4.2.2.
256. See id. n.94.
257. With respect to credit applications, the term "adverse action" means "[a]
refusal to grant credit in substantially the amount or on substantially the terms
requested in an application unless the creditor makes a counteroffer (to grant credit
in a different amount or on other terms) and the applicant uses or expressly accepts
the credit offered." 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(c)(1)(i) (2009).
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controversy about the notification requirement in that context. 258 On
the other hand, when someone merely refers a consumer to a lender,
he does not thereby become a creditor, and thus will not be obligated
to give notice about any adverse action. 259 Nevertheless, the case is
not that clear-cut when an automobile dealer does more than merely
referring a consumer, but stops short of making the final decision
about the loan. A question may arise in this context about whether the
dealer has reached the threshold of participating in the credit decision,
and thus should be recognized for all intents and purposes as a creditor
that is subject to the notice requirements relating to adverse action. 0
26
The dealer in Treadway v. Gateway Chevrolet Oldsmobile, Inc.
thought that it had fallen short of the participation benchmark when it
decided not to forward its customer's credit application to any lender
after reviewing the customer's credit report. If Gateway Chevrolet was
right in excluding itself from the definition of "creditor," it meant that
it did not have to give Treadway any notice of adverse action,
including its decision not to submit Treadway's application to lenders.
The Seventh Circuit viewed the dealer's decision to hold back the
credit application not merely as a participatory action, but as a
decision about whether to extend credit. 261 The court looked at the
dealer's restructuring of the loan terms to meet the lender's
expectations.262 It was not at all unusual for the dealer to insist on a
bigger down payment or a cosigner in order to make the customer's
application more attractive. 263 Furthermore, the dealer frequently set a
higher loan interest rate than the lender required and then split the

258. It is the creditor that must give notice of adverse action. See 12 C.F.R. §§
202.21, 202.9(a)(1),(2) (2009).
259, Such a person is merely an arranger and would not therefore be a creditor
for the purpose of being obligated to give notice of adverse action. See Official Staff
Commentary, 12 C.F.R. pt. 202 supp. 1, cmt. 202.2(l)-2 (2009). Nevertheless, an
arranger is still liable for violations of § 202.4(a) prohibiting discrimination and of §
202.4(b) prohibiting the discouragement of applications on a prohibited basis. See
id.
260. Treadway v. Gateway Chevrolet Oldsmobile, Inc., 362 F.3d 971 (7th Cir.
2004).

261. Id. at 980.
262. See id.
263. The dealer might also reduce the car's price to provide a more attractive
loan-to-value ratio. Id.
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difference with the lender. 264 The court did not have to rely only on
the dealer's decision not to send the consumer's application to any
lender; the other cumulative factors surely indicated the level of the
dealer's involvement in the credit decision. The dealer's failure to
forward the application to any lender deprived all lenders of the
opportunity to make a decision on the merits, and the dealer's inaction
therefore prevailed on the basis of the applicant's unsatisfactory credit
26 5
rating.
It is the dealer's regular participation in the credit decision,
including setting the terms of the credit, which persuades many courts
266
to recognize a dealer as a creditor. In Padin v. Oyster Point Dodge,
the dealer did not demand a higher down payment from the applicant,
suggest that the applicant produce a cosigner, nor negotiate with the
applicant for a higher interest rate.2 6 7 Nevertheless, the dealer stood to
gain when the lender added for the dealer's benefit an additional 2%
interest to the rate that the lender was prepared to accept for the
loan. 268 This aspect of the transaction mirrored that already recognized
in Treadway. 6 9 It was an example of a dealer's participation in setting
the terms of the loan that affected the consumer by resulting in an
increased rate. One can only surmise what the result would have been
if the dealer had not sought that advantage. Nevertheless, its attempt

264. This was as the "reserve." Id.
265. The dealer could not avoid being categorized as a creditor just because
the consumer never submitted her application to an actual lender. See id. at 981. But
Regulation B merely requires the applicant to request credit from a "creditor" as
defined under the ECOA, and the dealer was such a creditor in this case. See 12
C.F.R. § 202.2(1) (2009).
266. Padin v. Oyster Point Dodge, 397 F. Supp. 2d 712 (E.D. Va. 2005).
267. Id. at 719.
268. See id.
269. See Treadway, 362 F.3d at 980. In both Treadway and Padin the dealer
participated in setting the interest rate in order to benefit from the transaction with
the lender. In other words, the dealer participated in setting the terms of credit. See
id.; Padin, 397 F. Supp. 2d at 719. This must be contrasted with the situation in
McWhorter v. Elsea, Inc., No. 2:00-CV-473, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26914, at *63
(S.D. Ohio Apr. 11, 2007), where the defendant was not a participating creditor
because it did not benefit from a reserve and did not coordinate with a lender in
structuring the loan. The defendant had merely inquired of Bank One whether the
latter would purchase the installment sale contract and on what terms if defendant
made a loan to the consumer. Id. at *63-*64.
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to do so only managed to accord it a designation as a creditor, which
carried with it attendant responsibilities for informing the applicant
about the ensuing adverse action. In this scenario, the dealer seeks the
best of both worlds. It wants to enjoy the advantages of having a loan
funded without the corresponding duty to fulfill the notice
requirements if the loan application fails.
Occasionally, a court will recognize a dealer as a creditor, but will
find nevertheless that the dealer has taken no adverse action against an
applicant. In Barnette v. Brook Road,27 ° the court recognized the
dealer as a creditor, but refused to lay the blame for adverse action at
the dealer's doorstep because the dealer would not have profited
directly from the financing part of the transaction. 271 The Barnette
court recognized that the dealer "did not deny credit, refuse to grant
credit on substantially the terms requested, or change the terms set
forth in the [contract]., 272 It is true that in Barnette the dealer did not
take an action like that in Padin, when the dealer raised the interest
273
rate set by the lender in order to profit from the "reserve."
Nevertheless, the dealer in Barnette seemed to be involved in setting
the financial terms for each transaction, and as a matter of fact, those
terms were subject to the dealer's approval.274 The dealer had the right
to cancel any transaction if it found the financing terms
unacceptable. 5 It was the dealer that informed the consumer about
the need for a cosigner and convinced one lender to accept a lower
down payment from the consumer. 276 The Barnette court seemed
content that the dealer did not directly profit, aside from the sale of the
2 77
car, from the consumer's financing arrangement with the lender.
270. Barnette v. Brook Road, 457 F. Supp. 2d 647 (E.D. Va. 2006).
271. Seeid.at656.
272. Id.
273. Compare Padin, 397 F. Supp. 2d at 719 (finding adverse action when the
dealer raised the interest rate above that set by the lender in order to benefit from the
"reserve"), with Barnette, 457 F. Supp. 2d at 656 (finding that the dealer did not take
any adverse action when it circulated application to lenders that later denied it,
because dealer would not have directly profited from transaction other than through
the sale of car to consumer).
274. Barnette, 457 F. Supp. 2d at 655.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. See id. at 656.
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The dealer did not seek an increase in the interest rate in order to
enhance its yield.2 78
But the question remains whether a dealer must be poised to
receive something additional from the transaction for it to have an
obligation to give notice to the consumer if the application fails. The

court in Bayard v. Behlmann Automotive Services, Inc.279 certainly did
not think so, and with good reason. The dealer there went through the
usual ritual of assisting the consumer with the credit application,
280
obtaining the credit report, and then forwarding both to the lender.
When the lender denied the application, the dealer took up the
challenge to obtain credit for the consumer and convinced the lender
that it should grant the credit at a rate of 10.9%, rather than the
28 1
anticipated 3.9% that was available to qualified buyers.
The consumer did not receive the news of the 10.9% loan
approval with good humor, for not only did he reject that offer, but he
wanted a written statement of the reasons for not getting a loan at
3.9%.282 The dealer never provided that statement; instead he called
the consumer with the mixed news of the denial at 3.9%, but approval
at 10.9%.283 There was no benefit to the dealer beyond that arising
directly from the sale of the car, but nevertheless the court recognized
this transaction as more than a mere referral by the dealer to the
lender.284 It was the dealer's intervention that produced results,
278. In Padin, the dealer "became a 'participating creditor' required to give
notice to the consumer of any adverse credit decision by virtue of a higher interest
rate being charged than would otherwise have been required by the lender." 397 F.
Supp. 2d at 719. In Barnette the dealer did not participate in changing the terms of
the loan for its own advantage. 457 F. Supp. 2d at 656.
279. Bayard v. Behlmann Auto. Servs., Inc., 292 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (E.D. Mo.
2003).
280.

See id. at 1184.

281. See id.
282. The consumer believed that the dealer and the lender (GMAC) had
violated the statute by not giving him written notice of adverse action because he did
not get the 3.9% rate. See id.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 1187. The regulation applicable at the time of the Bayard decision
defined a creditor for purposes of the adverse notification requirement as "a person
who in the ordinary course of business, regularly participates in the decision of
whether or not to extend credit." 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(1) (2002). In 2003, the language
was revised to define "creditor" as "a person who, in the ordinary course of
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although at the disappointing rate of 10.9%.285 The "more than a
referral" in this case resulted in the dealer's participation in the
decision about credit. The dealer must have thought that it could avoid
liability on the ground that the decision on the 3.9% rate was not an
adverse action because the application did not specify such a rate, but
rather sought approval at "the lowest rate available." 286 It was to no
avail, for the court concluded that all parties understood that the
consumer was applying for the 3.9% rate.287 Had the court interpreted
"the lowest rate available" to mean the 10.9% rate, then of course
there would have been no adverse action because the lender would not
have refused to grant credit on the consumer's terms. The 3.9% rate
was the lowest rate available, but it was not available to the consumer
because he did not qualify.
B. The Effect of a Counteroffer
Sometimes a creditor makes a counteroffer to the consumer that is
not regarded as an adverse action. This is so because Regulation B
recognizes adverse action as a "refusal to grant credit in substantially
the amount or on substantially the terms requested in an application
unless the creditor makes a counteroffer.., and the applicant uses or
expressly accepts the credit offered., 288 It is not always easy to
ascertain whether a counteroffer is in play, or whether the creditor has
denied credit and the parties have followed up with a new transaction.
If there is first a denial, a subsequent transaction would not be
regarded as a counteroffer, and the creditor must give written notice of

business, regularly participates in a credit decision, including setting the terms of the
credit." 68 Fed. Reg. 13144, 13155, 13162 (Mar. 18, 2003). Nevertheless, the
Bayard court made the point that under either definition, the dealer was definitely a
creditor because it did not "merely accept and refer credit applications." 292 F.
Supp. 2d at 1187.

285. The court observed that "GMAC agreed to finance Bayard's purchase at
an APR of 10.9%, and

. .

. [the dealer] called Bayard and told him that he had been

denied credit at 3.9 % but that GMAC would extend him credit at 10.9%." Bayard,
292 F. Supp. 2d at 1184.
286. Id. at 1187.
287. Id.
288. 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(c)(1)(i) (2009).
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within thirty days after receiving a completed
an adverse action
289
application.
If the creditor makes a counteroffer that is not an adverse action,
courts have differed not only on the timing of the notice concerning
the counteroffer, but also on the question whether the notice must be
in writing. In Newton v. United Companies Financial Corp.,290 the
lender extended credit to the consumers in higher amounts than
requested in the applications, but did not give the consumers any
notice of a counteroffer as required. 291 The lender was confident of its
compliance with Regulation B because the loans had closed within
thirty days of approval in the new amounts. 292 It was significant that
the consumers never filled out an application for credit, but the lender
filled out a written application for each consumer after an initial
request for credit by the applicant or his broker. 293 Thus, at closing the
consumer saw for the first time the application that the lender had
created for him, reflecting loan amounts that the consumer knew
294
nothing about.

The court was persuaded that the lender should have given written
notice of its counteroffer, rejecting the proposition that the loan
documents themselves gave implicit notice at the closing of the terms
289. This situation will normally arise in spot delivery transactions where a
dealer and a consumer will agree on loan terms; the consumer takes possession of
the automobile that is the subject of the transaction, but the consumer is then offered
different terms because the lender rejects the original arrangement. The second
transaction would not be a counteroffer, but instead should be treated as a denial of
credit in the first instance that requires notice of an adverse action. See Miller v.
River Oaks Lincoln Mercury, Inc., 2005 WL 2284268 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 19, 2005)
(denying defendant's motion for summary judgment where dealer was successful in
arranging financing but did not give notice of prior denials); CREDIT
DISCRIMINATION, supra note 210, § 10.4.2; Cf. Madrigal v. Kline Oldsmobile, Inc.,
423 F.3d 819 (8th Cir. 2005) (finding no adverse action where dealer did not secure
credit for consumer on the terms covered in the installment contract but the dealer
continuously advised consumer about the steps taken to obtain financing for the
consumer).
290. Newton v. United Cos. Fin. Corp., 24 F. Supp. 2d 444 (E.D. Pa. 1998)
291. Id. at 461.
292. The court observed that "the lender must notify the borrower of the
making of a counteroffer, not just the ultimate approval or denial of that
counteroffer." Id. at 461-62.
293. See id. at 462.
294. See id.
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of the counteroffer.2 95 Perhaps the court was persuaded about the
writing requirement because the plaintiffs did not get any kind of
notice from the lender. 296 After all, the system in place encouraged the
lender to maintain constant contact with contractors and brokers,
while keeping the consumers in the background. When the lender did
not initially approve an application, it would put that application in a
file pending resubmission by a loan agent with different terms. 297 At
no time during that process was the consumer advised about any
change in the application. The Newton court did not have to insist on a
writing because the defendant did not give any kind of notice about a
counteroffer. The borrowers had submitted completed applications
and the defendant had an obligation to notify them of the making of
the counteroffer within the thirty-day period, and to not have them
confronted at the closing with loan documents containing different
terms from those anticipated.298
Regulation B requires written notice only in connection with an
adverse action and makes no mention of such a requirement for an
approval of, or a counteroffer to, an application for credit.2 99
Therefore, a court should always determine whether a lender has taken
adverse action before imposing a writing requirement on the lender.
The regulation excludes from the definition of "adverse action" any
denial of credit that is accompanied by a counteroffer that the
295. See id.
296. There was evidence that the consumer did not get "any notice of the
initial denial or the resubmission with different terms that was ultimately approved."
Id. at 461.
297. The court explained the process this way:
When her Request for Loan Approval was sent to Baton Rouge, the
underwriting department turned down that Request by "pending" the
Request (which apparently was a common practice in which the loan was
not explicitly denied, but left in limbo until resubmitted differently), and it
was only after the loan agent spoke with the underwriting department and
resubmitted the loan with different proposed terms that it was approved.
Id.
298. Both the statute and the regulation require written notice if the lender
takes adverse action. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(d)(2)(B) (2006); 12 C.F.R. § 202.9(a)(2)
(2009). But the Newton court did not seem to think that the lender took adverse
action. It spoke of the "violation of ECOA's notice of counteroffer requirement."
Newton, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 461.
299. 12 C.F.R. § 202.9(a)(1)(i).
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applicant accepts. 30 0 The appropriate inquiry is whether the lender has
taken adverse action, and not merely whether it has denied credit. In
refining the statutory definition of "adverse action," the regulation
leaves room for the creditor and consumer to agree on new terms for a
loan that the lender was unwilling to make in the first instance, If the
applicant accepts the lender's counteroffer, there is no good reason to
attach any adverse label to the transaction. 30 1 After all, the applicant
may recognize the new arrangement as more advantageous to himself
under the circumstances, and thus the rejection of the adverse
characterization actually recognizes the true state of affairs. It is
perhaps more realistic to regard the accepted counteroffer as providing
a satisfactory result for an application that2 was destined to fail, but
30
that succeeded instead on different terms.
It was this approach that found favor with the court in Diaz v.
ParagonMotors of Woodside, Inc.,3 0 3 when the applicant argued that
the dealer's decision to send his application to subprime lenders
constituted an "adverse action requiring written notification to the
applicant." 30 4 There was no hope of getting any financing from the
prime lenders, so the dealer rescued the sale by approaching subprime
lenders. 30 5 The applicant was fully informed about the new financing
when he signed the retail installment contract. 30 6 As a matter of
300. Id. § 202.2 (c)(1)(i).
301. See Ricciardi v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co. 164 F. App'x 221 (3d Cir.
2006); Diaz v. Paragon Motors of Woodside, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 2d 519 (E.D.N.Y.
2006); Diaz v. Va. Hous. Dev. Auth., 117 F. Supp. 2d 500 (E.D. Va. 2000); In re
United Cos. Fin. Corp., 277 B.R. 596 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002).
302. This is why Regulation B recognizes that there is no adverse action when
"the creditor makes a counteroffer ... and the applicant uses or expressly accepts
the credit offered." 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(c)(1)(i). It is to be noted that it is not
necessary for a lender to provide notice of a counteroffer before loan closing, as
long as the notice is given within thirty days. See Soslau v. PHH Mortgage Corp.
No. 06-1422, 2008 U.S. Dist LEXIS 55575, at *9 (E.D. Pa. July 18, 2008).
303. Diaz v. Paragon,424 F. Supp. 2d 519.
304. Id.at 532.
305. The dealer's representative could not recall if he had submitted the
consumer's application to primary lenders, but concluded that he would have sent it
to subprime lenders only because of the consumer's "inferior credit score, a 2001
bankruptcy, and a $17,179 charge-off to Chase Manhattan Bank . . . that would
immediately disqualify him for approval." Id. at 531 n.24.
306. See id. at 533.

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2009

57

California Western Law Review, Vol. 46 [2009], No. 1, Art. 2

CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

principle, the applicant could not be heard to complain about any
adverse action when he dutifully accepted the counteroffer that ensued
from the dealer's efforts. The applicant was probably relieved to get it
30 7
in light of the anticipated negative reaction from a prime lender.
C. Role of Consumer CreditReport
A consumer will certainly know that a lender took adverse action
when it notifies him that his loan was not approved. When the lender
bases its decision on information in the consumer's credit report, the
FCRA requires the lender to give notice to the consumer about the
adverse action, and provide him with other information, including
details about the right to obtain a free copy of his credit report.30 8 In
the case of insurance, the definition of "adverse action" is not that
clear-cut and in Safeco Insurance Co. of America v. Burr,30 9 the
Supreme Court had to determine whether a new applicant had
experienced an "increase" in his insurance premium when the
insurance company offered him a higher initial rate because of his
310
credit report.
The interesting thing about Safeco is that the consumers' claims
were based on the initial rates the insurance company charged for new
insurance policies.3 1 ' As a result, the company's position was that it
did not have to give the consumer an adverse action notice because
there could be no increase in any insurance charge when there was no
actual change in the premium. 312 Nevertheless, the Court was keen to
recognize the statutory purpose in reaching the adverse effects of
inaccurate credit reporting and, in this respect, it was necessary to take

307. The Official Staff Commentary advises that "[notifiction of approval
may be express or by implication." 12 C.F.R. pt. 202, supp. 1, cmt. 9(a)(1)-2 (2008).
There is no such provision covering either adverse action or a counteroffer.
308. The Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) imposes this notice obligation on
any person who takes "adverse action with respect to any consumer that is based in
whole or in part on any information contained in a consumer report." 15 U.S.C. §
1681m(a) (2006).
309. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47 (2007).
310. Id. at 60-61.
311.

See id.

312. The company said in effect that there could be no increase due to the
absence of a prior dealing between the parties. See id.
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stock not only of consumers with prior dealings, but also of consumers
who were being disadvantaged on their initial encounter with a
company. 3 13 A newly insured consumer who pays a higher premium
because of an erroneous report is in the same position as a repeat
customer whose renewal premium suffers the same fate.3 14 In both
cases, any action that is adverse to the consumer's interest and that is
based on a consumer report should give rise to an adverse action
notice that gives a consumer the information he needs to contest the
company's decision. 3 15 Although an increase may be more easily
recognizable when there is a renewal, an initial charge may be more
burdensome when a company issues a policy for a single, long-term
premium that may escape the consumer's notice, and the consumer
does not get the chance to revisit the transaction at any time in the
3 16
near future.
The adverse action must be based on the consumer report. 3 17 This
means that "consideration of the report must be a necessary condition
for the increased rate." 31 8 It is not enough for the company merely to
consult the credit report; the report must have some identifiable effect
313. Congress found that "[i]naccurate credit reports directly impair the
efficiency of the banking system, and unfair credit reporting methods undermine the
public confidence which is essential to the continued functioning of the banking
system." 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(1). In this connection, the legislative history does not
indicate any congressional intent to limit a remedy to consumers who had prior
dealings with the user of a credit report. See S. REP. No. 91-517, at 7 (1969) (stating
that the user of a credit report that charges a higher rate for credit or insurance
because of that report must so advise the consumer upon request); H.R. REP. No.
103-486, at 33 (1994) ("[W]henever a consumer report is obtained for a permissible
purpose ...,any action taken based on that report that is adverse to the interests of

the consumer triggers the adverse action notice requirements ....).
314. See Safeco, 551 U.S. at 62-63. The Court pointed out that notice about an
initial rate may be even more important than notice about a renewal rate because "if
• . .insurance is offered on the basis of a single, long-term guaranteed rate, a
consumer who is not given notice during the initial application process may never
have an opportunity to learn of any adverse treatment." Id. at 62 n. 12.
315. The term "adverse action" includes "a denial or cancellation of, an
increase in any charge for, or a reduction or other adverse or unfavorable change in
the terms of coverage or amount of, any insurance, existing or applied for, in
connection with the underwriting of insurance." 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(k)(l)(B)(i).
316. See Safeco, 551 U.S. at 62 n.12.
317. 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(a).
318. Safeco, 551 U.S. at 63.
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on the company's decision to assess a higher premium rate.3 19 If the
credit report made no difference to the company's decision, then it is
not in keeping with the statutory purpose that the consumer should
have any right to a notice if the company has not relied on the
report. 32 0 The rationale for a notice of adverse action is to provide a
mechanism for a consumer to raise questions about the company's
action if the consumer believes that the company has treated him less
favorably on the basis of his credit report.
It remains then to determine whether an initial rate is
disadvantageous to the consumer, and for that there must be a basis of
comparison. In this context, a consumer wants to know whether he
would have received a better rate if the company did not take his
credit report into account in setting its premium. It must be
acknowledged that the consumers in Safeco preferred the baseline for
the company's decision to be the rate that they would have obtained if
they had the best possible credit score, 321 but the Court was more
concerned with the actual effect that the credit report had on the
consumer's premium. 322 The Court found it more meaningful,
therefore, to rely on the neutral score which the consumers would
receive if the company did not consider the credit report, even though

319. Id. The Court provided the following example:
For instance, if a consumer's driving record is so poor that no insurer
would give him anything but the highest possible rate regardless of his
credit report, whether or not an insurer happened to look at his credit
report should have no bearing on whether the consumer must receive
notice, since he has not been treated differently as a result of it.
Id. at 64 n.13.
320. The Court referred to the FCRA's history to emphasize the importance of
the user's reliance on information in the consumer report. See id. at 63. The original
version of § 1692 m(a) required an increase to occur "because of' information in the
report. 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(a) (1976). The change to "based on," 15 U.S.C. §
1681m(a), only raises questions about congressional intent in this context, especially
when § 1681 m(b) employs the phrase "based on" in dealing with adverse action that
is based on information from third parties other than consumer reporting agencies.
The Court saw no problem with the variation in language and did not think that
Congress meant it as a substantive alteration of the statute. See Safeco, 551 U.S. at
63.
321. See id. at 65.
322. See id.
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it may prevent some first-time consumers who deserve 323
better-thanneutral credit scores from getting an adverse action notice.
VII. CONCLUSION

Congress has done its best to promote equal opportunities for
borrowers and fairness in reporting the credit history of consumers.
Both the ECOA and FCRA have laudable objectives, 324 and they work
together to guarantee that lenders and credit reporting agencies live up
to their responsibilities in the credit arena. Nevertheless, the details of
the statutory and regulatory schemes inevitably pose challenges to
lenders and credit reporting agencies alike, for lenders generally
325
depend upon their agencies to report credit information accurately.
When there is a breakdown in communication between them,
consumers suffer the consequences. This does not mean that every
323. See id. at 65-66.
324. Congress identified the purpose of the ECOA as follows:
The Congress finds that there is a need to insure that the various financial
institutions and other firms engaged in the extensions of credit exercise
their responsibility to make credit available with fairness, impartiality, and
without discrimination on the bases of sex or marital status .... It is the
purpose of this Act to require that financial institutions and other firms
engaged in the extension of credit make that credit available to all
creditworthy customers without regard to sex or marital status.
Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 93-495, § 502, 88 Stat. 1500 (1974)
(amended 1976). Congress amended the ECOA in 1976 to cover discrimination
based on "race, color, religion, national origin, sex or marital status, or age." Equal
Credit Opportunity Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-239, 90 Stat. 251.
With respect to the FCRA, Congress expressed the purpose this way:
It is the purpose of [the Act] to require that consumer reporting agencies
adopt reasonable procedures for meeting the needs of commerce for
consumer credit, personnel, insurance, and other information in a manner
which is fair and equitable to the consumer, with regard to the
confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy, and proper utilization of such
information in accordance with the requirements of [the Act].
15 U.S.C. § 1681(b) (2006).
325. It must be noted, however, that a consumer reporting agency's obligation
is to follow "reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy." 15
U.S.C. § 168le(b) (2006). Therefore, a lender's dependence on the information that
an agency provides does not necessarily lead to an agency's liability. See FAIR
CREDIT REPORTING, supra note 35, § 4.4.1; 2 RALPH C. CLONTZ, JR., FEDERAL FAIR
LENDING AND CREDIT PRACTICES MANUAL § 11.04 [3] (rev'd ed. 2008).
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adverse action by a creditor results from an inaccurate credit report,
but there is ample opportunity for lenders to play an important role in
ensuring that a consumer understands the reasons for a decision not to
grant credit.
Regulation B requires a lender to give specific reasons for its
adverse action on an application for credit. 326 Although the Board has
provided some guidance on the kind of language that a creditor may
use to categorize the reasons for its denial,327 from time to time
creditors have formulated their own rejection language. One cannot be
sure whether they have done so because they are dissatisfied with the
Board's handiwork, or whether the Board's formulation does not meet
the standards of precision that would clearly identify the lender's
reasons for declining an application. 328 Nevertheless, the Board should
not be discouraged by the inventiveness of some lenders in crafting
their own phrases. Instead, this should provide an incentive for the
Board to compile as exhaustive a list as possible, with a view to
helping lenders avoid the pitfalls of imprecision. 329 It is
understandable that it may be impossible to cover every conceivable
reason for a lender's adverse action, but in those few cases where the
lender finds itself outside the mainstream because of unique
circumstances, it will know that the reasons it gives must be no less
specific than those identified in the Board's sample form.
Nevertheless, it should have sufficient guidance from the Board's
efforts to comply with the notice requirements.
The FCRA also provides some opportunity for reflection on the
mechanism for allowing a consumer reporting agency to supply a
prescreened list of consumer reports to lenders that intend to make a
firm offer of credit to each consumer on the list. Many an argument
326. 12 C.F.R. § 202.9(b)(2) (2009).
327. 12 C.F.R pt. 202 app. C (2009).
328. See, e.g., Aikens v. Nw. Dodge, Inc., No. 03C 7956, 2006 WL 59408, at
*3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 5, 2006), where the lender preferred to use the term "excessive
credit obligations" instead of the language in the Board's sample form, "excessive
obligations in relation to income."
329. The Federal Reserve Board recognizes that the sample forms may not be
appropriate for all lenders and suggests that lenders should modify the checklist
where appropriate. 12 C.F.R. pt. 202 app. C (2008). It then gives an example when a
lender might have to use the terms "inadequate down payment" or "no deposit
relationship with us" as the reason for taking adverse action. Id. These would be
good candidates for inclusion on the list.
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has been made that the so-called "firm offer of credit" should contain
the material terms of the credit so that a consumer will have all the
details at hand in order to decide whether to accept the offer. Although
the courts have not seen the need for a creditor's disclosure of all
material terms, 330 it is evident that the statutory term "firm offer of
credit" continues to cause problems. The difficulty lies not with the
courts, but rather with a definition that holds out more hope for the
consumer than is really intended, and therefore what may be firm in
statutory terms turns out lacking meaningful details. The drafters were
rightly concerned with not allowing credit report users to have access
to consumer reports simply to advertise their products. 33 1 This is why
some courts were concerned about the value of the offer to the
consumer. 332 Although the Seventh Circuit later explained that its
ruling in Cole v. U.S. Capital, Inc. was limited to situations where
there was both an offer of credit and an offer of merchandise, 333 this
still did not remove the challenge of dealing with the firmness of an
offer of credit. It is one thing to suggest that a creditor does not have
to list all the material terms in its offer of credit, but it is quite another
for a creditor to advertise that it is willing to lend money to consumers
on a prescreened list when the offer is skimpy on information. The
challenge here is for the statute to strike a happy medium, and not
allow a creditor too much leeway to solicit customers without
providing the contours of the credit or insurance contemplated. This
focus would improve the
benefit to consumers that ensues from
334
prescreened solicitations.
330. See Poehl v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 528 F.3d 1093 (8th Cir.
2008); Murray v. New Cingular Wireless Serv., Inc., 523 F.3d 719 (7th Cir. 2008);
Dixon v. Shamrock Fin. Corp., 522 F.3d 76 (1st Cir. 2008); Putkowski v. Irwin
Home Equity Corp., 423 F. Supp. 2d 1053 (N.D. Cal. 2006); Soroka v. Homeowners
Loans Corp., No. 8:05 CV 2029 T 17MAP, 2006 WL 4031347 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 12,

2006).
331. Congress was interested in balancing the privacy concerns of consumers
about prescreening with the benefits accruing from a "firm offer of credit or
insurance." See S. REP. No. 103-109, at 13-14 (1993).
332. See Cole v. U.S. Capital, Inc., 389 F.3d 719 (7th Cir. 2004); Hyde v.
RDA, Inc., 389 F. Supp. 2d 658 (D. Md. 2005)
333. Murray, 523 F.3d at 722.
334. One report has found that "prescreened solicitations are important in
promoting competition and enhancing consumer welfare in the markets for credit
and insurance." BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYSTEM, REPORT TO
THE CONGRESS ON FURTHER RESTRICTIONS ON UNSOLICITED WRITTEN OFFERS OF

CREDIT AND INSURANCE 3 (2004).

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2009

63

California Western Law Review, Vol. 46 [2009], No. 1, Art. 2

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol46/iss1/2

64

